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ABSTRACT
The security of wireless networks and systems is becoming increasingly important as wireless
devices are more and more ubiquitous nowadays. The wireless channel exhibits the spatial un-
correlation property, which is that the characteristics of a wireless channel become uncorrelated
every half carrier wavelength over distance. This property has prompted an emerging research
area that utilizes wireless channel characteristics to achieve location distinction, to detect location
changes or facilitate authentication of wireless users, and to establish shared secret key between
legitimate communicators. This dissertation includes two work toward the security improvement
of existing wireless networks and systems. With the discovered channel camouflage and manipu-
lation techniques in wireless networks, traditional wireless channel based authentication or secure
communication systems are broke or renovated.
The first work proposes a new attack against all existing location distinction approaches that
are built on this spatial uncorrelation property. With the discovered attack, an attacker can easily
bypass authentication or camouflage location changes by creating an artificial wireless channel
similar to a legitimate one. This dissertation also presents a detection technique that utilizes an
auxiliary receiver or antenna to identify these fake channels.
On the other hand, the second work shows that the legitimate users can also benefit from
constructing these artificial wireless channels and apply them in a novel wireless key establishment.
The proposed technique enables the transmitter to specify any content as the secret key and securely
deliver it to the target receiver, and meanwhile removes the reconciliation process which is necessary
for conventional wireless key establishment schemes.
vii
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, security is becoming increasingly important for wireless networks as wireless devices
such as smart phones are more and more pervasive and adopted by many critical applications.
The broadcast and superposition natures of wireless medium make wireless networks face many
security challenges in ensuring reliable and/or secure communications in the presence of adver-
sarial parties [1]. Due to the broadcast nature of wireless medium, wireless communications can
be overheard by any unintended receivers with eavesdropping capability within the transmitter’s
communication range. Meanwhile, superposition can bring the overlapping of multiple signals at
the receiver. The eavesdropping and jamming attacks are two typical security threats. Eavesdrop-
ping means that an adversary passively listens to the communication between legitimate parties.
Jamming means that a jammer actively emits wireless signal, so that the signals from the jammer
and the sender collide at the receiver side and thus the signal reception process would be disrupted.
1.1 Wireless Physical Layer Security
Though traditional cryptographic schemes can potentially address the security of wireless net-
works, they have multiple limitations in certain common scenarios,
• Lots of wireless devices are lack of computational power necessary to handle encryption and/or
decryption algorithms. Thus, many cryptographic schemes become di cult to apply.
• Traditional cryptographic schemes require fixed key management infrastructure to distribute,
refresh and revoke keys, which is sometimes unavailable for a certain wireless network.
• In dynamic wireless networks, key management is significantly more di cult as wireless de-
vices move in and out of a network frequently.
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• Traditional cryptographic methods typically assume limited computational resources at ad-
versaries, and are usually derived from unproven assumptions. An attacker with very strong
computational power may break the cryptographic system.
Unlike classical cryptography, information-theoretic security, first proposed by Shannon in [2],
guarantees message secrecy without relying on the computational hardness of mathematical prob-
lems [3]. Physical layer security has recently become an emerging hot topic in wireless commu-
nication systems [4, 5]. It applies the principles of information-theoretical security and places no
computational restrictions on adversaries. Thus physical layer security is able to complement other
upper layer security schemes in wireless communication systems [6]. Di↵erent from cryptographic
approaches, physical layer security aims to achieve objectives such as authentication and confiden-
tiality by exploiting the physical layer properties of the communication system, such as thermal
noise, interference, and the time-varying nature of fading channels.
In general, a wireless channel possesses two kinds of characteristics that can be utilized for
physical layer security: the spatial uncorrelation property and wireless channel reciprocity.
Normally, wireless signals propagate in the air through multiple paths due to obstacle reflec-
tion, di↵raction, and scattering. Therefore, for wireless signals sent from di↵erent locations, the
destination receiver can observe di↵erent channel characteristics from these signals, because they
experience di↵erent multipaths and accordingly undergo di↵erent channel e↵ects (e.g, power at-
tenuation, phase shifting, and time delay). Scientists have discovered that the wireless channel
normally exhibits the spatial uncorrelation property; i.e., the characteristics of the wireless channel
become uncorrelated every half carrier wavelength over distance [7].
The transmitter and receiver of one wireless link can observe the same channel simultaneously,
a property known as wireless channel reciprocity. Specifically, archetypal character Alice sends Bob
a wireless signal, from which Bob can extract a channel characteristic of the wireless link between
them. In turn, Bob sends a wireless signal to Alice so that she can do the same.
Wireless channel characteristics are dependent on the multipath environment surrounding the
communicators. Due to the above two properties, exploiting wireless channel characteristics pro-
vides a means of achieving physical layer security.
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This dissertation discovers vulnerabilities of wireless systems built on exploiting wireless channel
characteristics, and proposes the defense approach to improve the security of existing systems cor-
respondingly. This dissertation mainly introduces two work. In the first work, an adversary utilizes
the channel camouflage technique to hide her real location or impersonate that of another legitimate
user, and thus successfully break previous wireless channel based authentication schemes. In the
second work, a transmitter utilizes the channel manipulation technique to develop a novel wireless
key establishment technique, with which the transmitter can arbitrarily select any content as the
secret key and securely deliver it to the target receiver, and meanwhile remove the reconciliation
process, which is necessary in traditional wireless key establishment techniques.
Chapter 2 summarizes related work, and details of my two work are presented in Chapters 3
and 4, respectively. Chapter 5 discusses future work. In the following, I give the motivations and
backgrounds of the two work respectively.
1.2 Virtual Multipath Attack and Defense for Location Distinction
Location distinction in wireless networks aims to detect a wireless user’s location change, move-
ment or facilitate location-based authentication. Enforcing location distinction is important for
many wireless applications [8, 9]. For example,
• Wireless sensor networks are usually utilized to monitor a target area by sensing the physical
or environmental conditions (e.g., temperature, sound, and pressure) [10]. Administrators
of the sensor networks would like to enforce location distinction to prevent an unauthorized
person from moving the sensors away from the area of interest.
• Wireless networks are vulnerable to sybil attacks due to the broadcast nature of the wireless
medium [11]. Here, an adversary forges a significant amount of fake user identities to fool a
networked system. Location distinction can tell whether or not all identities are originated
from the same location, and thus detect such attacks.
• Active radio frequency identification (RFID) tags are often used in warehouses for tracking
inventory and maintaining the physical security. It has been assumed that “location distinc-
tion is critical to provide a warning and to be able to focus resources (e.g., security, cameras,
and personnel) on moving objects” [8].
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The spatial uncorrelation property of wireless channels has been widely explored and adopted
to enforce location distinction of wireless devices (e.g., [12, 8, 9, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20,
11]). Specifically, changes in wireless channel characteristics have been utilized to identify location
changes of a wireless transmitter [8, 9, 13].
This dissertation, however, discovers a new attack against all existing location distinction ap-
proaches built on the spatial uncorrelation property of wireless channels. By launching such an
attack, the adversary can generate any chosen wireless channel characteristics at a target receiver
to deteriorate the location distinction capability of the receiver. The key idea of the discovered
attack is to create a virtual multipath channel as undetectable camouflage to make the receiver
believe a specified channel characteristic chosen by the attacker.
To demonstrate the virtual multipath channel, I first explain the real-world multipath e↵ect,
which is the fundamental reason for the spatial uncorrelation property. Wireless signals normally
propagate in the air through multiple paths due to obstacle reflection, di↵raction, and scattering [8].
Therefore, for wireless signals sent from di↵erent locations, the receiver can observe di↵erent chan-
nel characteristics from these signals, because they experience di↵erent multipaths and accordingly
undergo di↵erent channel e↵ects (e.g, power attenuation, phase shifting, and delay). To fool a re-
ceiver, the attacker needs to create an “artificial channel” that can exhibit a multipath propagation
feature similar to the real-world multipath.
Here is an example to illustrate how the attacker can create such a channel. Figure 1.1(a) shows
a simple real multipath scenario, where a signal sent by the transmitter travels on two paths, i.e.,
the reflection path and the direct path. At time t0, the receiver starts to receive the signal copy
that travels on the direct path. The reflection path is longer than the direct path, and thus at a
later time t0 +  t, the receivers receives the aggregation of the signal copy from the direct path
and the one from the reflection path.
Now consider the scenario in Figure 1.1(b): there is only one direct path between the attacker
(i.e., a dishonest transmitter) and the receiver, but the attacker wants to make the receiver believe
that two paths exist similar to the real multipath propagation shown in Figure 1.1(a). To this end,
the attacker sends the signal alone first. After duration  t, she superimposes a fresh signal copy
onto the one already in transmission. The attacker scales both the original signal and the time-
delayed copy by attenuation factors w1 and w2 to mimic the signal amplitude attenuation caused
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Figure 1.1: Creating a virtual multipath similar to the real multipath propagation.
by real paths. Consequently, the receiver observes an aggregation of one signal plus a time-delayed
copy, with each undergoing a certain amplitude attenuation, and thus thinks that they are caused
by the multipath e↵ect.
The example in Figure 1.1(b) assumes that there exists only one direct path between the
attacker and the receiver (i.e., no multipath e↵ect is considered). In practice, the attacker’s crafted
multipath signal is a↵ected by the real multipath e↵ect as well, and she should have a way to deal
with the impact of this real multipath. The dissertation reveals that the attacker can easily achieve
this goal by reverse-engineering existing wireless channel estimation algorithms and performing
linear transformations on the original signal.
To defend against this attack, this dissertation also proposes a detection technique utilizing an
auxiliary receiver (or antenna) at a di↵erent location to identify the virtual multipath channels and
the fake channel characteristics. Specifically, the attacker must craft its transmitting signal to make
the target receiver believe a particular channel characteristic. However, the dissertation shows that
this crafted signal exhibits inconsistent channel characteristics to the auxiliary receiver. Based on
this result, the dissertation creates a defense scheme that does not require the receivers to have any
prior knowledge about the real channel characteristics between themselves and the transmitter.
1.3 Manipulatable Wireless Key Establishment
Wireless key establishment has been widely studied in the past years (e.g., [21, 22, 23, 24, 25,
26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32]) for its easy implementation, low computational requirement, and small
energy consumption.
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The common intuition is to establish a shared key utilizing wireless channel reciprocity. The
same observed channel enables the transmitter and receiver of one wireless link potentially to agree
on a same key. Next, the spatial uncorrelation property of the wireless channel provides the security
basis for these wireless key establishments. Hence, an eavesdropper able to receive the signal sent
by transmitters Alice or Bob will be unable to decrypt it, as the extracted channel characteristic
will di↵er from that visible to Alice and Bob, so long as the eavesdropper is not co-located with
either character.
Existing wireless key establishment techniques normally entail three steps to share a secret key
between Alice and Bob, namely quantization, reconciliation, and privacy amplification. Quanti-
zation involves both parties sampling the channel characteristic and then quantizing the sampled
data into initial binary bit sequences. Unfortunately, channel noise may cause the quantization
step to render some moderately di↵erent bit sequences for Alice compared to Bob. Reconciliation
schemes aim to correct these mismatched bits through information exchanges. Finally, each com-
municator performs privacy amplification to confuse a malicious listener from deducing the secret
bit sequence.
This workflow naturally imparts two major drawbacks. First, the shared key originates from
the actual channel, and the communicators cannot control such a key. The established key depends
on the wireless channel dynamics, and a static environment results in an established key of low
entropy [23]. Second, Alice and Bob must exchange multiple messages over the public channel to
agree on an identical key during reconciliation. These messages contain sensitive key-related infor-
mation and not only create an opportunity for an attacker to capture the exchanged information
and infer the key [22], but also highly decrease the e ciency of key establishment. In this paper,
we evolve fundamental aspects of existing key establishment techniques to eliminate these afore-
mentioned deficiencies, by removing the mutual message exchange process heretofore universally
required. Specifically, we enable Alice to deliver a key to Bob by sending a one-time message, once
Alice receives a key establishment inquiry from Bob. Bob is then passive and no longer needs to
make any unprotected communications.
Intuitively, this sort of key establishment scheme can be achieved if the transmitter can manip-
ulate the channel characteristics observed by the receiver. This transmitter will select any random
content as the key and generate channel characteristics equal to the key for the receiver to observe.
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Figure 1.2: Real v.s. artificial multipath e↵ect.
Because the transmitter can specify any content as the key, the transmitter can further encode the
key with error-correction code, and accordingly the receiver will be able to automatically correct
any mismatched bits without sending key-related information to the transmitter over the public
channel.
The spatial uncorrelation property is caused by the multipath propagation phenomenon, where
a signal travels in the air over multiple paths due to signal reflections, di↵ractions, and scatter-
ings. Geographically separated transmitter and receiver pairs encounter di↵erent multipaths and
necessarily di↵erent channel characteristics. Hence, if we can create an “artificial multipath” e↵ect,
then we can manipulate the channel characteristics observed by the receiver, and specify “artificial”
channel characteristics equal to the encoded key at the receiver.
Figure 1.2(a) shows a simple multipath propagation example involving three paths. The trans-
mitter sends a wireless signal. The receiver observes the superposition of three signal copies, each
of which is distorted by the corresponding path. We use hi to denote the distortion introduced
by Path i. In Figure 1.2(a), the vector [h1, h2, h3] represents the channel characteristics of the
3-path channel and this vector is referred as the channel impulse response [33]. The shared key is
normally quantized from the channel impulse response [22, 30, 28]. The signal copy distorted by
Path i can be usually modeled by hix, where x is the original, undistorted signal [33]. It is easily
understood then that multipath propagation in the real world can be simulated using simple delay
and multiplication operations. Figure 1.2(b) illustrates how this may be accomplished. Here, the
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transmitter sends the original signal as well as time-delayed copies of this signal to mimic the dif-
ferent arrival times of each multipath component. The original signal and all copies are multiplied
against coe cients wi to mimic the signal distortion caused by each path i. Consequently, the
receiver observes an aggregation of one signal plus time-delayed copies, each undergoing a certain
path distortion, and thus obtains a channel impulse response vector of [w1, w2, w3] corresponding
to the expected multipath e↵ect but created entirely by the transmitter. The delay (e.g., t1   t0)
is the arrival time di↵erence of two consecutively received signals. The challenges in order to build
the proposed scheme are summarized below.
First, to specify the chosen channel impulse response at the receiver, the transmitter must
cancel the real multipath e↵ect without compromising the spatial uncorrelation property, which
serves as the security foundation for all wireless key establishment techniques. To address this, we
create a customized channel manipulation technique.
Second, upon receiving the signal, the receiver estimates and quantizes the channel impulse
response to obtain the key. Hence, the transmitter must represent the key in the form of channel
impulse responses, and find an appropriate key mapping method to enable the receiver to achieve a
low error rate after the quantization. Accordingly, we design a key mapping technique to translate
a key into manipulated channel impulse responses of a multipath channel.
Third, an important question is whether an eavesdropper can decode the key with the help of
the same error correction code. When an eavesdropper’s channel is uncorrelated with the receiver’s
channel, the key observed by the eavesdropper exhibits more deviation from the actual key than
the receiver, allowing the ability of the communicators to choose a code type, which can resolve a
number of bit errors larger than the receiver typically encounters but smaller than the number by
the eavesdropper.
1.4 Summary of Contributions
The contributions of this dissertation are summarized below:
• Virtual multipath attacks and corresponding defenses: We identified a new attack against
existing location distinction approaches built on the spatial uncorrelation property of wireless
channels. By launching such attacks, the attacker can create virtual multipath channels
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to deteriorate the location distinction capability of a target receiver. To defend against
this attack, we proposed a detection technique that utilizes a helper receiver to identify the
existence of virtual channels. We also explored virtual multipath attacks and corresponding
defenses in OFDM systems. We performed real-world evaluation on the USRP platform
running GNURadio. The experimental results demonstrated both the feasibility of the virtual
multipath attack and the e↵ectiveness of the defense approach.
• Manipulated key establishment technique: We propose a novel wireless key establishment
technique between a transmitter and receiver pair in the presence of an eavesdropper. Our
scheme enables the transmitter to specify any content as the secret key and removes the rec-
onciliation process, which is necessary in conventional wireless key establishments. We docu-
ment real-world implementation on the USRP platform running GNURadio, demonstrating
the feasibility and reliability of the proposed technique.
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CHAPTER 2
RELATED WORK
As wireless devices become more and more pervasive and essential, the security of wireless
systems is becoming increasingly important. Existing wireless transmitter authentication, wireless
channel based authentication and secret key generation schemes are summarized below, respectively.
2.1 Wireless Transmitter Authentication
Authenticating wireless transmitters is usually the first step to enforce a security scheme. Ex-
isting techniques using non-cryptographic approaches to authenticate wireless transmitters can be
classified into three categories [34]: software-based fingerprinting (e.g., [35, 36, 37]), location dis-
tinction (e.g., [8, 9, 14]), and radiometric identification (e.g., [34, 38, 39]).
In software-based fingerprinting approaches, discrepancies in software configuration are used as
fingerprints to distinguish between wireless nodes [34]. For example, Franklin et al. [35] proposed to
use the implementation dependent di↵erences among device drivers to identify 802.11 nodes. Kohno
et al. [37] proposed to use clock skews in TCP and ICMP timestamps to fingerprint networked
devices.
In location distinction based authentication, a signal is authenticated by verifying whether it
originates from the expected location of the transmitter. Received Signal Strength (RSS) (e.g., [40])
and wireless link signatures have been used to enable such location distinction [8]. The RSS based
methods directly estimate the location of a signal origin using the RSS values. However, such
methods can be defeated with an array antenna, which can fake arbitrary source locations [8].
The wireless link signature based approaches authenticate the channel characteristics between the
transmitter and the receiver [8, 9, 14].
In radiometric identification approaches, the distinctive physical layer characteristics exhibited
by wireless devices are utilized to distinguish between them. Transient based techniques (e.g., [38])
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identify a wireless device by looking at the unique features “during the transient phase when the
radio is turned on” [41]. Modulation based techniques (e.g., [34]) measure di↵erentiating artifacts
of individual wireless frames in the modulation domain to identify the device.
2.2 Wireless Channel Based Authentication
The uniqueness extracted from the physical properties of each wireless channel provides a
method to authenticate di↵erent wireless devices [42, 43]. A receiver normally observes di↵erent
wireless channels with signals sent from transmitters at di↵erent locations, and thus the variations
of a wireless channel can be utilized to authenticate the location of a transmitter, i.e., achieve
location distinction.
Existing location distinction approaches have been focused on exploiting the spatial uncorrela-
tion property of wireless channels (e.g., [8, 9, 14, 15, 44, 45, 11]). These approaches demonstrated
their success in various wireless scenarios, especially for the high-frequency systems (e.g., WiFi net-
works) that feature a very short electromagnetic wavelength. However, two recent studies identified
a vulnerability of these approaches [7, 46], and discovered that the wireless spatial uncorrelation
property may be violated in a poor multipath environment (e.g., strong line-of-sight path). The
work in [47, 19] made a further attempt to attack location distinction systems using channel im-
pulse responses. The authors found that a third-party attacker may impersonate Alice to Bob by
mimicking the channel impulse response of the wireless link between them, and the authors named
such attacks as mimicry attacks. Although both mimicry attacks and the virtual multipath attacks
are against the security measures based on the wireless channel characteristics, they di↵er from
each other in the following aspects:
First, a pre-condition to launch mimicry attacks is the knowledge of the real channel impulse
response between Alice and Bob (thus they assume the existence of a spy node). However, a virtual
multipath attacker can still launch attacks without this knowledge. Moreover, if the attacker knows
the real channel impulse response, she can make the receiver believe a specific channel impulse
response. Therefore, virtual multipath attacks have a broader attack impact and less prerequisites.
In addition, we extend the virtual multipath attacks and the defense to MIMO and OFDM systems.
It should be possible to extend mimicry attacks to these systems as well, because the attacker can
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directly manipulate the training signals for OFDM and MIMO systems with the knowledge of all
channel information. However, mimicry attacks require to place a spy node close to the receiver.
Thus, it becomes much more di cult to launch mimicry attacks when the receiver is equipped with
a MIMO system, because the attacker has to place one spy node for each antenna to know the
channel.
Second, both attacks di↵er in technical design methodology. The essential way of mimicry
attacks is to manipulate the training signal such that the receiver believes an impersonated channel
impulse response. Such a manipulation at the training signal level fools the receiver to accept an
incorrect channel estimate, but the data payload after the training signal still goes through the real
channel. As a result, the receiver will use an incorrect channel estimate to compensate the real
channel e↵ect, leading to incorrect packet decoding. In contrast, the virtual multipath attack uses
a delay-and-sum process (with chosen weights) to create a virtual channel and pass all the data
(e.g., training sequence and data payload) to be transmitted through this virtual channel. The
receiver then not only gets a faked channel impulse response, but also uses it to successfully decode
the entire data payload. Hence, the design methodology of virtual channel attacks ensures more
stealthiness and consistency to fool the receiver.
Third, the proposed defense against the virtual multipath attack does not require any shared
secret key between the transmitter and the receiver, whereas the defense proposed in [19] requires
that the communicators to share a secret key. Such a requirement indicates that a key distribution
and management system should be deployed prior to the enforcement of the defense, reducing the
scalability and feasibility of the relevant approach.
Finally, because of the simplicity of the delay-and-sum process, as discussed earlier, the virtual
multipath attacks can be interestingly extended to enhance the wireless security. For example,
researchers have proposed to establish a key between two wireless devices using the channel impulse
responses between them. Such a key is totally determined by the wireless physical layer feature
and cannot be easily manipulated by the users. The idea of virtual channel attacks can be utilized
here to enable the transmitter to control and update the shared key periodically and provide a rich
set of shared keys among wireless users. Such attacks can also enable anonymous communications
by protecting location privacy of wireless users via virtual channel camouflage.
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Another recent work that is closely relevant with the proposed defense approach is SecureAr-
ray [18]. This work utilizes the physical angle-of-arrival (AOA) of a multi-antenna access point to
enforce user authentication. Our proposed defense technique uses channel impulse responses ob-
served by multiple antennas to protect location distinction systems. However, our defense targets
attacks against location distinction systems built on the spatial uncorrelation property of wireless
channels, whereas SecureArray is designed to combat spoofing attacks that attempt to impersonate
legitimate WiFi clients. Both approaches apply to di↵erent application domains.
We point out that the virtual multipath attack discovered in this paper doesn’t target traditional
localization systems using AOA, TOA, RSS, etc. Thus, complementary analysis and measures are
necessary to protect these systems. Besides, in our future work, we will consider extending existing
location distinction algorithms so that they can be adaptive to a more dynamic environment.
2.3 Secure Communication in Wireless Networks
Due to the broadcast nature of the wireless medium, private communications are easily eaves-
dropped. This has spurred extensive research into secure communication between legitimate com-
municators. One research stream is to transmit private messages between a legitimate sender and
receiver over a wiretap channel, and the other is to establish a shared key between a legitimate
sender and receiver that stays private from eavesdroppers [3]. The study of secure message trans-
mission through wiretap channel coding was first proposed by Wyner in 1975 [48]. In a wiretap
channel, a sender encodes messages and sends it to a receiver, when the channel from the sender
to the adversary is “noisier” than the channel from the sender to the receiver, such a scheme can
provide information-theoretic privacy. This research is theoretically sound, however, it is hard to
realize in practice.
In this dissertation, we focus on the second research stream. Since the use of physical layer
characteristics of a wireless channel for key generation was first proposed in [49], it has formed
a fruitful research area in recent decades, ranging from theoretical analysis to practical experi-
ments [21, 29, 50]. [21] proposed a wireless key establishment scheme exploiting channel reciprocity
and deep fades and presented a theoretical performance analysis of the scheme. [29] investigated the
theoretical secret key capacity shared by the transmitter and the receiver. [50] further investigated
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the theoretical limits of secret key generation using multiple physical layer characteristics for the
key source. These e↵orts have set the theoretic basis for the feasibility of key establishment via
physical layer characteristics of a wireless channel.
A number of groups have performed real-world experiments to validate their proposed key
establishment methods. [23] evaluated the e↵ectiveness of secret key extraction from received signal
strength variations in wireless channels using real world measurements in a variety of settings.
[25, 51] provided experimental studies utilizing multiple antennas to exploit reciprocal channel
fluctuations for key generation. [30] proposed to employ channel state information measured from
OFDM subcarriers in practical environments for secret key establishment.
However, existing wireless key establishments focus on generating keys directly from the channel.
They select a certain channel metric and quantize it to obtain bits to form a key. A number of
channel metrics have been explored, such as signal envelopes [21], channel impulse response [22,
28, 30], signal phases [31], received signal strength [23, 32, 27, 52], and the frequency-selectivity
of channel fading [53]. In these schemes then, the established key is highly dependent upon the
selected channel metric while the communicators themselves hold little control. In our work, we
enable the transmitter to specify and control the key at will. Thus, our scheme makes it easier for
a transmitter to establish the same secret key with multiple receivers than existing wireless key
establishments. For example, the transmitter in our scheme can act a public key server [54] and
distribute a same key to di↵erent legitimate receivers.
Another significant distinction lies in our work, requiring no reconciliation, where previous
e↵orts [21, 22, 23, 27, 28, 29, 53, 31, 30] need reconciliation to correct mismatched bits. [22] points
out that assuming Alice and Bob share an authorized channel during this process is unrealistic,
leading to the possibility of spoofing attacks. As we do not perform reconciliation, we have no such
concerns. To the best of our knowledge, [55] is currently the only e↵ort to propose wireless key
establishment which does not require reconciliation. This group developed a method to restrict
key generation to periods of channel fluctuation and thus achieved near-perfect key agreement not
requiring of reconciliation. In contrast, our scheme uses error correction code to enable the receiver
to automatically detect and correct any mis-recovered bits.
Some other work also utilize manipulated channel information to achieve di↵erent goals (e.g., [56,
57]). For example, [56] utilized false channel information to enable the transmitter to hide its
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location or impersonate another user’s location while [57] utilized fake channel information to
eavesdrop information received by a target user. In our work, however, we construct a manipulated
channel and use it to establish secret keys between legitimate communicators.
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CHAPTER 3
VIRTUAL MULTIPATH ATTACK AND DEFENSE
This chapter1 begins to introduce the discovered virtual multipath attack for location distinction
in wireless networks. This section also introduces the defense method against the virtual multipath
attack.
3.1 Preliminaries
In this section, we show how location distinction is usually enforced and introduce the prevalent
algorithms that are used to estimate wireless channel characteristics.
3.1.1 Channel Impulse Response
As discussed, a wireless signal usually propagates in the air along multiple paths due to reflec-
tion, di↵raction, and scattering. A receiver then receives multiple copies of the signal from di↵erent
paths, each of which has a di↵erent delay due to the path it traverses. The received signal is the
sum of these time delayed copies. Each path imposes a response (e.g., delay and attenuation) on
the signal traveling along it [8], and the superposition of all responses between two nodes is referred
to as a channel impulse response [33]. Wireless channels can be characterized by channel impulse
responses.
The multipath e↵ects of di↵erent wireless links are di↵erent, and so are the channel impulse
responses [8]. Due to this reason, a channel impulse response has been utilized to provide location
distinction [8, 9]. Specifically, to determine if the transmitter has changed its location, the receiver
estimates the channel impulse response of a newly received signal and compares it with the previous
1This chapter was published in ACM MobiCom 2014 [56], and IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing 2016 [58].
Permission is included in Appendix A.
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estimation result. The location change is detected if the di↵erence between the newly estimated
channel impulse response and the previous one exceeds a certain threshold.
3.1.2 Estimating Channel Impulse Responses
Estimating channel impulse responses is a must-have function for most modern wireless sys-
tems [33, 59]. With the correct channel estimation result, the communicators are able to adapt
transmissions to current channel conditions, which is critical for achieving reliable communication
with high data rates [33]. Note that the signal propagation paths are unresolvable (i.e., each mul-
tipath component signal can not be extracted from the composite signal) if the di↵erences between
the arrival times of the signals traveling on these paths are much smaller than the symbol duration,
which is the transmission time of a wireless physical-layer unit [33]. Hence, existing channel esti-
mation algorithms assume a resolvable multipath, i.e., the arrival times of signal copies traveling
on di↵erent paths are larger than the symbol duration.
Channel impulse responses are usually estimated using training sequences [60, 61]. Specifically,
the transmitter sends a training sequence (i.e., a sequence of bits) over the wireless channel, while
the receiver uses the same training sequence and the corresponding received signal samples to esti-
mate the channel impulse response. The training sequence can be pre-shared [61] or reconstructed
from the received signal [8].
The physical layer channel estimation can be processed in either frequency (e.g. [8, 9]) or time
domain (e.g., [61]), which are inter-convertible due to the linear relation between the two domains.
In the following, we describe the channel estimation method in the time domain.
Channel impulse response estimation exploits the (known) training sequence and corresponding
received samples. The transmitter converts the training sequence into M physical layer symbols
(i.e., complex numbers that are transmission units at the physical layer [33]). The transmitter
then sends the M symbols to the wireless channel. Let x = [x1, x2, ..., xM ] denote the transmitted
symbols in the training sequence. Assume that there exist at most L resolvable paths (L can be
computed based on practice wireless system configurations [33]). Thus, the receiver can receive L
copies of x, each traveling on one path and undergoing a response caused by the corresponding path.
The vector y of received symbols is the convolution sum of the L copies of x. Let h = [h1, h2, ..., hL]T
be the channel impulse response, where hi is the response of the i-th path. The received symbols
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y can be represented by [61]
y = h ⇤ x+ n, (3.1)
where n is the noise and ⇤ is the convolution operator. The matrix form of Equation (3.1) is
y =
26666666666666666666666664
x1 0 · 0
x2 x1 · 0
· · · ·
xL · · x1
· · · ·
xM · · xM L+1
0 xM · ·
· · · ·
0 0 · xM
37777777777777777777777775
266666666664
h1
h2
·
·
hL
377777777775
+ n (3.2)
Rewriting Equation (3.2) in a compact matrix form yields
y = Xh+ n, (3.3)
where X is a (L +M   1) ⇥ L Toeplitz matrix, containing L delayed versions of the transmitted
symbols x, and y is a vector consisting of (L+M   1) received symbols.
Two estimators are generally used to estimate h from Equation (3.3): least-square (LS) and
linear minimum mean squared error (LMMSE) [62]. LS is given by hˆLS = (XHX) 1XHy, where
(·)H and (·) 1 are the conjugate transpose and matrix inverse operators [63]. LMMSE is written
as hˆLMMSE = Rh(Rh +  2n(XX
H) 1) 1hˆLS, where Rh is the multipath channel correlation matrix
(i.e., the statistical expectation of hhH) and  2n is the variance of the noise [64], both assumed prior
knowledge. If the correlation matrix Rh and noise variance  2n are both known, LMMSE is used;
otherwise, LS is used. We here focus on the LS estimator, because for location distinction schemes
in a realistic environment, precise channel correlation statistics and noise knowledge are di cult to
obtain due to the time-variant property of wireless channels and potential movements of wireless
nodes.
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3.2 Assumptions and Attack Model
The location distinction system consists of a transmitter and a receiver. Both are equipped with
radio interfaces that can transmit and receive wireless signals. The receiver aims to verify whether
or not the transmitter has changed location. Towards this goal, the receiver estimates the channel
impulse response from a wireless signal received from the transmitter, and then compares it with the
previous estimation results to generate a decision. To constantly enforce the location distinction,
the receiver periodically sends an inquiry to the transmitter, and the transmitter responds to the
inquiry by sending wireless signals back to the receiver.
We assume that the transmitter is malicious and aims to hide her location change or impersonate
movements while she is actually static. To achieve this objective, the transmitter attempts to
mislead the receiver through creating a virtual multipath channel, which can fool the receiver to
estimate a fake wireless channel impulse response chosen by the transmitter. We assume that the
malicious transmitter knows the training sequence used for the channel estimation.
We assume that the channel impulse response is stable in a short period of time (e.g., a packet
duration), which is a common assumption for designing wireless communications. We further
assume that the malicious transmitter knows the actual channel impulse response between herself
and the receiver. This can be achieved by estimating the channel impulse response from the wireless
signals (e.g., location distinction inquiries) emitted by the receiver.
3.3 Virtual Multipath Attack
In this section, we describe how to create a virtual multipath channel to defeat location distinc-
tion algorithms. The attacker can launch two types of attacks. In a basic attack, the attacker can
use any weights to craft a virtual multipath signal. This will fool the receiver to obtain random,
incorrect estimates of the channel impulse response. In an advanced attack, with the knowledge of
the real channel impulse response between herself and the receiver, the attacker is able to compute
exact weights that make the receiver estimate the chosen channel impulse responses specified by the
attacker. In the following discussion, we focus on the advanced attack due to the more misleading
nature of such attacks.
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Figure 3.1: Inside the attacker: she first sums (with weights) all delayed copies of the original
signal, then transmits the aggregated signal out.
3.3.1 Overview of the Attack
As we mentioned earlier, the attacker can generate an aggregated signal with time-delayed
copies to emulate the real multipath e↵ect.
To launch the attack, the attacker needs to know when she should add a delayed copy into the
transmitting signal. According to Equation 3.2, the channel estimator models each path by delaying
it for one symbol duration. Specifically, the i-th arrived signal copy arrives at time t0+(i 1) ·1/R,
where t0 is the arrival time of the first arrived signal copy and R is the transmission symbol rate.
Thus, the attacker can superimpose a copy into the transmitting signal at time t00, t00 + 1/R, · · · ,
t00+(L  1) · 1/R to emulate L paths, where t00 is the start time of the attacker’s first transmission.
Accordingly, the time delay for a signal copy is  t = 1/R. Figure 3.1 illustrates the attacker’s signal
manipulation and transmission process. For the i-th delayed signal copy si, she multiplies it with a
weight of wi. Hence, the attacker’s transmitting signal xa can be represented as
PL
i=1wisi. These
weights ensure that when the transmitting signal xa propagates to the receiver through the real
multipath environment, it can result in the attacker’s desired channel impulse response observed at
the receiver. In the following, we give a high-level overview regarding how to obtain these weights.
Let h denote the channel impulse response between the attacker and the receiver. The signal ya
received from the attacker can be represented as ya = h⇤xa+n, where xa and n are the transmitting
signal and the channel noise, respectively. The receiver uses ya to estimate the channel impulse
response, and the estimation result is given by (XHX) 1XHya, where X is a Toeplitz matrix
constructed from the training sequence. Let ha denote the channel impulse response chosen by the
attacker. The attacker aims to make this estimation result equal to ha, i.e., (XHX) 1XHya = ha.
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By substituting ya = h ⇤ xa + n and xa = ⌃Li=1wisi into this equation, the attacker can solve the
weights and we show the detailed calculation process in Section 3.3.2.
3.3.2 Obtaining the Weights
A technical challenge for the attacker is that she needs to obtain the weights used in the virtual
multipath channel to make the receiver believe a particular channel impulse response. In the follow-
ing, we show how the attacker can obtain such weights. When training sequence [x1, x2, · · · , xM ]
first goes through the virtual channel with weights w1, w2, · · · , wL, the resulting transmitting signal
xa can be represented in the following matrix form.
xa =
26666666666666666666666666664
x1 0 · 0
x2 x1 · 0
· x2 · 0
· · · ·
xL · · x1
· · · ·
xM · · xM L+1
0 xM · ·
· · · ·
0 0 · xM
37777777777777777777777777775
266666666664
w1
w2
·
·
wL
377777777775
= Xw.
The length of xa is L+M   1, and we let xa = [xa1 , xa2 , ..., xaL+M 1 ]. The transmitting symbols
xa will go through the real multipath channel and the corresponding received symbols ya is (we
omit the noise term for the sake of simplicity)
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ya = h ⇤ xa = Xah
=
26666666666666666666666664
xa1 0 · 0
xa2 xa1 · 0
· · · ·
xaL · · xa1
· · · ·
xaM+L 1 · · xaM
0 xaM+L 1 · ·
· · · ·
0 0 · xaM+L 1
37777777777777777777777775
266666666664
h1
h2
·
·
hL
377777777775
.
The length of ya is L+ (L+M   1)  1 = 2L+M   2. Assume that the receiver is not aware that
the original training sequence has been manipulated by the attacker. He thinks that the length
of the training sequence is M , the number of paths is L, and hence the number of corresponding
received symbols should be M +L  1. The receiver then uses the first received M +L  1 symbols
to calculate the channel impulse response. Let y0a denote the vector formed by these symbols and
we can represent y0a as y0a = Iya = I(Xah), where IL+M 1 is an (L+M  1)⇥ (2L+M  2) matrix
whose diagonal elements are all 1’s. The receiver estimates the channel impulse response based on
the equation y0a = Xhˆ. The attacker must make hˆ = ha hold. Thus, using matrix operations, we
have
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y0a = Xhˆ = Xha = I(Xah)
=
26666666666666666666664
h1 0 . 0 0 . 0
h2 h1 . · 0 . 0
. · . . · . ·
. . . h1 0 . 0
hL . . h2 h1 . 0
0 hL . . h2 . 0
. . . . . . .
0 0 . hL hL 1 . h1
37777777777777777777775
26666666666666666666664
xa1
xa2
.
.
xaM
xaM+1
.
xaM+L 1
37777777777777777777775
= Hxa,
where H is a Toeplitz matrix of h. We can then solve xa from the above equation, and xa =
(HHH) 1HHy0a = (HHH) 1HH(Xha). Note that xa = Xw. Thus, we can solve the weights w
from the above equations, and obtain
w = (XHX) 1XH [(HHH) 1HH(Xha)].
3.3.3 Initial Simulation
As an initial validation, we simulate the virtual multipath attack using the CRAWDAD data
set [65], which contains over 9300 real channel impulse responses measured in an indoor environment
with obstacles (e.g., o ces and furniture) and scatters (e.g., windows and doors).
3.3.3.1 Simulation Process
We pick two nodes (i.e., nodes 31 and 40) from the data set as the attacker and the receiver,
and obtain the channel impulse response h between them. We randomly choose another channel
impulse response ha (i.e., the one between nodes 34 and 40) from the data set, and the attacker aims
to fool the receiver to get a channel estimation result of ha rather than h. We generate a training
sequence x of 64 bits using a pseudorandom number generator. The attacker computes the weights
based on h, ha, and x, and then creates a virtual multipath channel by aggregating the weighted
delayed copies of the training sequence x as shown in Figure 3.1. Thus, the corresponding received
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Figure 3.2: The channel impulse responses hr estimated at the receiver.
symbols y0a can be computed via y0a = I(Xah)) + n, where n is the gaussian noise and we set the
signal-to-noise (SNR) 20dB in the simulation. Finally, the receiver estimates the corresponding
channel impulse response from the virtual channel.
3.3.3.2 Simulation Result
Figure 3.2 plots the real channel impulse response h between the attacker and the receiver, the
chosen channel impulse response ha that the attacker wants to emulate, and the channel impulse
response hr estimated by the receiver. We can observe that ha is very close to hr under the virtual
multipath attack.
The CRAWDAD data set stores five measurements of the channel impulse response for every
pair of nodes. In the simulation, for the real channel impulse response h, we randomly pick one as
the comparison base. The Euclidean distance between the other four real channel impulse responses
and h ranges between 0.0490 and 0.2297. The Euclidean distance between the estimated channel
impulse response hr and h is 0.5782, which is out of the above range. However, the Euclidean
distance between hr and ha is 0.1054, which falls into the normal range of variation of the channel
impulse responses. This means that once the attacker establishes a virtual multipath channel, the
attacker can hide her real locations since hr 6= h, or impersonate a node at a di↵erent location
since hr ⇡ ha.
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Figure 3.3: The empirical cumulative distribution functions of dreal and dest using the CRAWDAD
data set.
We repeated the simulation using all data in the CRAWDAD data set. Figure 3.3 plots the em-
pirical empirical cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of the Euclidean distance dreal between
the the chosen channel and the real channel response, as well as that of the Euclidean distance dest
between the chosen one and the channel impulse response estimated under the attack. We can see
that the probability that dest is smaller than dreal is high. In particular, 95.13% of dest is less than
0.2295, whereas only 1.59% of dreal is less than this value. Thus, if the receiver uses 0.2295 as the
detection threshold to verify channel impulse responses, the receiver will get a mis-detection rate
of 0.9513 and a false alarm rate of 0.9841 (i.e., 1 - 0.0159).
The simulation result demonstrates the theoretical feasibility of the virtual multipath attack.
In Section 3.6, we reveal the practical impact of such attacks with real world experiments.
3.3.4 Discussion
3.3.4.1 Complexity at the Attacker
To launch virtual multipath attacks, the attacker requires to sum all delayed signal components
with weights, as shown in Figure 3.1. This delay-and-sum process can be easily implemented using
software (e.g. designing a delay-and-sum C++ module in GNU radio for USRP) or hardware (e.g.
using flip-flop components to delay signals and using accumulators to sum all signal components
in FPGA). Such an architecture does not significantly incur software or hardware complexity.
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3.3.4.2 Message Demodulation at the Receiver
By adding delayed signals together, a virtual multipath attacker introduces inter-symbol in-
terference to its transmission signals. We note that such signals are decodable at the receiver.
It is common for a receiver to receive signals with inter-symbol interference due to the wireless
multipath e↵ect. A receiver normally uses channel estimation results to learn multipath channel
conditions [33]. The estimated channel impulse response is then used in the demodulation pro-
cess to compensate the multipath e↵ect and convert the self-interference signal into a meaningful
message.
As long as the attacker passes the training and the information payload through the same
virtual channel as shown in Figure 3.1, the received signal at the receiver will go through the same
combined channel e↵ect of virtual and realistic channels. In this regard, although the receiver
obtains the estimation of a fake channel impulse response, such an estimation result still represents
the combined channel e↵ect that the data goes through. Therefore, the receiver will successfully
decode the original message using this estimation result. The only impact of virtual multipath
attacks is that the receiver is fooled by fake channel impulse responses.
3.3.4.3 Impact of the Time Delay
Theoretically, the attacker can set an arbitrarily small delay (e.g, 1 nanosecond) to create a
much richer virtual multipath e↵ect at the receiver. However, modern channel estimation algorithms
estimate only resolvable paths whose inter-arrival durations are no less than one symbol duration,
and it has been shown that using the estimation of resolvable paths is su cient to compensate the
channel e↵ect for signal demodulation. Thus, at the receiver’s point of view, the channel consists
of multiple resolvable paths. This means that it is su cient to set the delay in virtual channel
generation to be one symbol duration (e.g., just generate resolvable paths) to fool the receiver’s
view on the channel. Even if the attacker reduces the delay to generate a more fine-grained virtual
multipath channel, the receiver can still observe the resolvable paths and the corresponding channel
impulse response. Thus, decreasing the delay can only add implementation complexity to the
attacker, but will not cause more impact of the attack at the receiver. On the other hand, if
attacker utilize a larger delay (e.g., larger than the symbol duration), the receiver may not observe
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enough multipath e↵ect under the virtual multipath attacks and thus the attack impact is limited.
Therefore, it is reasonable to set the delay to be one symbol duration to balance the attack e↵ect
and complexity.
3.3.4.4 Example Attack Scenarios
The example scenarios where virtual multipath attacks may exist include: (1) movement de-
tection: an attacker may hide its movement by creating a static virtual channel impulse response
at the receiver, e.g., a wireless sensor can be moved from the monitoring area but the movement is
not detected; (2) detection of sybil attacks: an attacker may bypass the detection of sybil attack by
pretending identities that are originated from di↵erent locations; (3) authentication: the attacker
may impersonate another wireless transmitter. This attack scenario requires the attacker to know
the channel impulse response between the target transmitter and the receiver, and thus imposes
some limitations to the attacker. However, since the virtual multipath channel attacks can produce
any channel estimation results at the receiver, such attacks are still a threat to existing channel
fingerprinting based authentication schemes; (4) In addition to the attack scenarios, on the other
hand, the attacks can be further utilized to enhance the wireless security. For example, the virtual
channels can be used to provide a rich set of shared keys between two wireless devices, or enable
anonymous communications by protecting location privacy of wireless users via virtual channel
camouflage.
3.4 Defending against the Virtual Multipath Attack
Virtual multipath attackers are able to make the receiver believe any channel characteristic the
attacker chooses. At the receiver, it seems that there is no way to tell whether the signal goes
through real or virtual multipath scenario. Hence, existing location distinction methods built upon
distinguishing locations from channel characteristics (e.g., [15, 11, 8, 9]) will be easily defeated by
virtual multipath attacks.
The intuition behind our defense strategy is that nobody can craft one key to open two di↵erent
doors. In other words, if a receiver cannot tell whether there is an attack or not, maybe a second
receiver can. As a result, the proposed approach makes use of an auxiliary receiver or antenna, which
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Figure 3.4: The receiver uses two di↵erent training sequences x1 and x2 to estimate the channel
impulse response from two successive transmissions, respectively.
we refer to as a helper. The helper is placed more than half a wavelength away from the receiver
to ensure a distinct channel characteristic. We let the receiver use two di↵erent training sequences
x1 and x2 to estimate the channel impulse response alternatively. Without loss of generality, we
assume that the receiver uses x1 to estimate the channel from the first transmission, and uses x2
to estimate the channel from the second transmission.
We discover that for both transmissions, at the receiver, the virtual channel created by a
malicious transmitter (i.e., the attacker) can result in the same estimated channel impulse responses
(equal to the one chosen by the attacker). However, at the helper, the virtual channel leads to
di↵erent estimated channel impulse responses. We summarize the defense approach in Figure 3.4.
The reason that the attacker cannot fool both the receiver and the helper is detailed next.
3.4.1 Defense Analysis
Let h denote the real channel impulse response between the attacker and the receiver. For the
first transmission, the attacker must solve the weights, so that the equation h ⇤ xa1 = ha ⇤ x1 hold
and the receiver will obtain ha as the channel impulse response, where xa1 is the aggregated signal
with weighted time-delayed copies of the training sequence x1. Let hhelp denote the real channel
impulse response between the attacker and the helper. The corresponding signal received by the
helper can be represented as hhelp ⇤ xa1. Thus, the channel impulse response hˆhelp1 estimated by
the helper can be solved from the equation that hˆhelp1 ⇤ x1 = hhelp ⇤ xa1, and we have
hˆhelp1 = (X1
HX1)
 1X1H(hhelp ⇤ xa1), (3.4)
where X1 is a Toeplitz matrix of x1.
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For the second transmission, both the receiver and the helper use the training sequence x2 to
estimate the channel. Similarly, to fool the receiver, the attacker must generate another weights
w2, so that the corresponding aggregated signal xa2 makes the equation h ⇤ xa2 = ha ⇤ x2 hold.
The corresponding channel impulse response hˆhelp2 estimated by the helper is
hˆhelp2 = (X2
HX2)
 1X2H(hhelp ⇤ xa2), (3.5)
where X2 is a Toeplitz matrix of x2.
Note that for both transmissions, the channel impulse response estimated by the receiver are
always the same, because the weights are “customized” so that the receiver will obtain the attacker’s
chosen channel impulse response after the channel estimation. However, from Equations 3.4 and 3.5,
we can see that the first estimated channel impulse response hˆhelp1 is not necessarily equal to the
second estimated channel impulse response hˆhelp2 , because X1 6= X2. This means the attacker
cannot fool the receiver and the helper at the same time.
Thus, if the successive estimated channel impulse responses show dramatic changes in a short
time at the helper, the helper then triggers an alert at the receiver regarding the existence of
potential virtual multipath attacks. In practice, the helper may use a threshold to enforce the
detection. If ||hˆhelp1   hˆhelp2 || is larger than the threshold, then the attack is assumed. The
threshold can be selected based on the empirical studies to achieve an optimized detection accuracy.
In Section 3.6.4, we show an example of the threshold selection. Note that in the defense system,
the helper and the receiver can switch their roles, i.e., if the attacker attempts to fool the helper
instead of the receiver, the receiver will estimate two di↵erent channel impulse responses and
therefore detect such an attack.
3.4.1.1 Attackers with Helper
The attacker may also bring a second transmitter to confuse the receiver. Figure 3.5 shows such
a scenario. We refer to the attacker’s second transmitter as the attacker’s helper. Let h11, h12,
h21, h22 denote the channel impulse responses between the attacker and the receiver, the attacker
and the receiver’s helper, the attacker’s helper and the receiver, and the attacker’s helper and the
receiver’s helper, respectively. To successfully launch the virtual channel attacks without being
detected, the attacker must generate the same channel impulse response at the receiver’s helper
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Figure 3.5: The attacker also brings a second transmitter to confuse the receiver.
for both transmissions. Let hhelp denote such a channel impulse response. Further let ha denote
the one that the attacker expects to generate at the receiver for both transmissions. The attacker
needs to make the following equation hold:
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
h11 ⇤ xa1 + h21 ⇤ xh1 = ha ⇤ x1
h12 ⇤ xa1 + h22 ⇤ xh1 = hhelp ⇤ x1
h11 ⇤ xa2 + h21 ⇤ xh2 = ha ⇤ x2
h12 ⇤ xa2 + h22 ⇤ xh2 = hhelp ⇤ x2
, (3.6)
where xa1, xh1, xa2, and xh2 are the actual signals to be transmitted by the attacker and her
helper for the first and second transmissions. To break the proposed defense, the attacker must
solve them from Equation 3.6. This implies that h11, h12, h21, h22 should be all available to the
attacker. Otherwise, the linear system lacks necessary coe cients to generate solutions. However,
the acquisition of h12 and h22 will impose di culty for the attacker, because the receiver’s helper
can be designed passive, i.e., it receives wireless signals but doesn’t actively send out wireless signals
to the channel. Due to the close proximity, the receiver can communicate with its helper through
the cable connection or internal circuit. A passive helper of the receiver eliminates the chance for
the attacker to extract the channel impulse responses based on heard wireless signals.
3.4.1.2 Extending to MIMO Systems
In case of a very powerful attacker, who is able to set up a collaborator transmitter that is
co-located with the receiver’s helper (i.e., at the exact physical location of the receiver’s helper),
h12 and h22 may be obtained from the wireless signals sent by the collaborator transmitter. Nev-
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ertheless, the defense methods can be easily extended to deal with these attacks by increasing the
number of helpers at the receiver.
To facilitate the reader’s understanding, we consider a multiple-input and multiple-output
(MIMO) scenario, where the receiver and the attacker haveM andN antennas respectively. Assume
the fake channel impulse responses that the attacker aims to generate at the receiver’s antennas
are h1,h2, ...,hM , and the real channel impulse responses between each of the attacker’s antenna
and each of the receiver’s antennas is denote as hij , where i = 1, 2, ..., N and j = 1, 2, ...,M . We
assume hij are all available to the attacker due to the existence of the collaborator transmitters
placed at the same locations as the receiver’s antennas. Let xa1i and xa2i(i = 1, 2, · · · , N) denote
the signals to be transmitted by the attacker’s i-th antenna for the first and second transmissions.
Similar to the previous discussion, the attacker must solve them from
PN
i=1 hij ⇤xa1i = hj ⇤x1 andPN
i=1 hij ⇤ xa2i = hj ⇤ x2 for 8j 2 {1, 2, ...,M}.
If N  M , the attacker can find a unique solution or infinite solutions of xa1i and xa2i . However,
if N < M , this linear system is overdetermined, which yields no feasible solution. This means that
the attacker cannot find appropriate values of transmitted signals (or weights), so that the receiver
will observe the same channel impulse responses at all antennas for two transmissions. Therefore,
if the number of the receiver’s helper nodes is greater than that of the attacker’s helper nodes, the
virtual multipath channel attacks can be detected.
3.4.1.3 Defense Discussion
The receiver can normally use one passive helper, i.e., a secret wireless tap, to detect the attacks.
The exception happens when the attacker knows all channel information from her and her helpers
to the receiver’s passive helper (by placing a spy node co-located with or extremely close to the
receiver’s helper), which is in fact a very harsh requirement for the attacker.
We point out that under this circumstance it is still feasible to detect virtual multipath attacks
as long as the receiver has more helpers than the attacker. A significant advantage of the receiver
over the attacker is that the receiver just needs to find contradiction to detect the attack; while the
attacker has to know all channel information for signal manipulation to make sure no contradiction
is found. In particular, when the receiver adds one more passive helper, it actually reduces the
attack situation to the normal case. In order to beat the defense, the attacker must meet all the
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Figure 3.6: The channel estimation results at the receiver for the first and the second transmissions.
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Figure 3.7: The channel estimation results at the helper for the first and the second transmissions.
following requirements at the same time to beat the receiver: (1) add one helper, (2) add one
spy node at the exact location of the receiver’s new helper to know the channel information, (3)
synchronize herself and all her helpers to transmit the manipulated signal at the physical-layer
symbol level. Hence, the attacker has much more costs to beat the receiver with more passive
helpers.
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3.4.2 A Case Study
We show an example of the defense approach using the real measured channel data from the
CRAWDAD data set. We randomly pick three nodes from the data set, and they are used as the
attacker (node 14), the receiver (node 3), and the helper (node 32), respectively. We also randomly
pick one channel impulse response (between nodes 4 and 9) from the data set, and it is used as the
fake channel impulse response that the attacker would like to fool the receiver. Let h, hhelp, and
ha denote the channel impulse responses between the attacker and the receiver, the attacker and
the helper, and the fake one chosen by the attacker.
We generate two 64-bit training sequences x1 and x2. For the first and the second transmissions,
we compute the weight vectors w1 and w2, so that the corresponding virtual channels will result
in estimated channel impulse responses that are equal to ha at the receiver. As discussed earlier,
these weight vectors should be computed based on h, ha, x1, and x2.
Figure 3.6 shows the channel estimation outcomes at the receiver for the first and the second
transmissions, respectively. We can see that both estimated channel impulse responses are consis-
tent with each other. The Euclidean distance between them is 0.1127. We also calculate the channel
estimation results at the helper. As shown in Figure 3.7, these channel estimates significantly di↵er
from each other. The Euclidean distance between them is as high as 0.5701, which is out of the
normal range of variation of the channel impulse responses. Thus, the virtual multipath attack is
detected.
3.5 Virtual Multipath Attacks and Defenses in OFDM Systems
Orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) is a popular wireless communication scheme
that encodes the digital signal using multiple sub-carrier frequencies. These sub-carriers are nor-
mally narrow-band (e.g., 802.11 a/g physical layer advocates an OFDM sub-carrier bandwidth less
than 0.5 MHz). Thus, OFDM systems are robust against channel fading caused by the multipath
e↵ect. For an OFDM system, the channel estimation is done by estimating the channel impulse
response of each sub-carrier. Due to the lack of the multipath fading, the channel estimation result
of each sub-carrier is a complex number rather than a vector, and the final channel estimation out-
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put of an OFDM system is formed by these complex numbers. In this section, we explore virtual
multipath attacks and corresponding defenses in OFDM systems.
3.5.1 Attacks against OFDM Systems
The virtual multipath attacks can be easily extended to OFDM systems, because the mapping
from the time-domain to frequency-domain is linear. The delay-and-sum process can be replaced
by a much simpler procedure, in which the attacker multiplies chosen weights to sub-carriers.
Specifically, let [h1, h2, ..., hn] denote the actual channel characteristic between the attacker and the
receiver, where hi is the channel characteristic of the i-th sub-carrier and n is the number of sub-
carriers. Further let [x1, x2, ..., xn] denote the training sequence encoded by the OFDM modulator,
where xi is the i-th element of the encoded training sequence. The symbol received at the i-th
carrier can be represented by yi = hixi. To fool the receiver to obtain a fake channel estimation
result of [ha1 , ha2 , ..., han ], the attacker needs to make the equation hixai = haixi hold, where xai
is the symbol to be transmitted by the attacker at the i-th sub-carrier. Thus, xai =
haixi
hi
, and the
weights that the attacker needs to multiply to sub-carriers are
ha1
h1
,
ha2
h2
, ..., hanhn .
3.5.1.1 Impact of Oversampling
In this work, we follow the same way to formulate the problem as in the wireless communication
literature: sampling at the baseband rate (Nyquist rate) is su cient to represent any signal. Thus,
in theory, oversampling does not a↵ect the results of channel estimation or the virtual channel
manipulation. In practice, oversampling can surely provide better signal representation. Thus,
the output symbols generated by the virtual multipath processing will be then oversampled at
the subsequent intermediate frequency (IF) and radio-frequency (RF) modules to generate better
digital signal representations. Oversampling in OFDM is padding zeros in null subcarriers and then
taking a longer IFFT at the transmitter. A corresponding FFT with the same size is performed
at the receiver, then data is recovered at the data subcarrier (not at the null subcarriers). Thus,
oversampling does not a↵ect the virtual channel manipulation for OFDM either.
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3.5.2 Defenses in OFDM Systems
Despite the ease for an attacker to extend virtual multipath attacks to OFDM systems, as
described above, there are no straightforward ways to extend the previously discussed detection
approach to these systems, because the channel estimation of an OFDM system is significantly
di↵erent from that of a traditional communication system.
Let hri and h
h
i denote the actual channel characteristic between the attacker and the receiver
and between the attacker and the helper, respectively. Let xi1 and xi2 denote the i-th element of
the first and second training sequences. Let xai1 and xai2 denote the symbol to be transmitted
by the attacker at the i-th sub-carrier in the first and second transmissions. Further let hrai and
hhai denote the fake channel estimation results that the attacker would like to generate at the i-th
sub-carrier of the receiver and the helper. The conditions for the attacker to launch the attack
without being detected are summarized as
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
hrixai1 = h
r
aixi1
hhi xai1 = h
h
aixi1
hrixai2 = h
r
aixi2
hhi xai2 = h
h
aixi2
.
We can see that there exists a solution for hhai which is
hhai = h
r
ai ·
hhi
hri
. (3.7)
Thus, when the attacker causes the receiver to observe the same channel estimation results for
the first and second transmissions, the two channel estimation results at the helper side are also
the same. Therefore, the virtual multipath attack in OFDM systems cannot be detected by the
previously proposed regular defense, which just observes the di↵erence of two channel estimates at
the helper side for two transmissions with di↵erent training sequences.
However, we identify alternative ways to close the loophole of the regular defense and defend
against virtual multipath attacks in OFDM systems. We first categorize two typical objectives of
attackers to confuse the location distinction:
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1. Motion camouflage: The attacker is moving but she aims to deceive the receiver about the
moving activities. Towards this end, the attacker makes the receiver believe that she is
stationary by causing the estimated channel at the receiver to appear unchanged.
2. Immobility camouflage: When the attacker is stationary, she wants to make the receiver be-
lieve that she moves to a new location by changing the estimated channel at the receiver. The
typical example targeting this objective is the Sybil attack, in which the attacker pretends to
change her location and therefore identity while she indeed just changes the channel between
herself and the receiver, as the receiver will observe di↵ering channels between transmitters
in di↵erent locations.
In practice, the two objectives may happen alternatively. For attacks against OFDM systems, we
propose a corresponding defense strategy for each attack goal.
3.5.2.1 Motion Camouflage
To detect motion camouflage, we propose to utilize a passive helper at the receiver side and
observe the di↵erence of the two channel estimates at this helper side.
To illustrate the defense against motion camouflage, we use Figure 3.8 as an example, where the
attacker is previously at location 1 and then moves to location 2, and she wants to make the receiver
believe that she is stationary. Let hrLi and h
h
Li
denote the actual channel characteristic between
the attacker and the receiver and that between the attacker and the helper when the attacker is at
location i, respectively. Let hra denote the fake channel estimation results that the attacker would
like to generate at the receiver. Based on Equation 3.7, we can obtain the estimated channel hha1
at the helper when the attacker is at location 1 as hha1 = h
r
a ·
hhL1
hrL1
. Similarly, when the attacker
moves from location 1 to location 2, we can obtain the estimated channel hha2 at the helper under
the attack as hha2 = h
r
a ·
hhL2
hrL2
. Note that though the attacker is actually at the new location (i.e.,
location 2), the channel estimation result that the attacker would like to generate at the receiver is
still hra so that the receiver believes that the attacker is stationary (i.e., remaining at location 1).
In the normal case when no virtual multipath attack occurs, when the estimated channel at
the receiver is unchanged (i.e., the receiver is actually stationary), the estimated channel at the
receiver’s helper should maintain the same for both channel estimations, i.e., hha1 = h
h
a2 should hold.
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Figure 3.8: Motion camouflage.
However, from their calculation formulas above, we can see that hha1 = h
h
a2 does not necessarily
hold since the actual channels hhL1 and h
h
L2
are unknown to the attacker when the receiver’s helper
is passive, except when the following equation holds
hrL1
hhL1
=
hrL2
hhL2
. (3.8)
However, Equation 3.8 rarely holds in practice as the real channel impulse response is uncontrollable
and unpredictable. A real world experiment is presented to demonstrate this in Section 3.5.2.2.
Therefore, when the receiver realizes that its two successive estimated channels are the same,
it should discern one of two possible reasons: either the attacker’s location is not changed, or the
attacker wants to achieve motion camouflage. Meanwhile, if a di↵erence between the two channel
estimates can be observed at the receiver’s helper side, the virtual multipath attack aiming to
achieve motion camoufage is discovered.
3.5.2.2 Immobility Camouflage
For this case, since the attacker changes the channel estimation result generated at the receiver,
based on Equation 3.7, the estimated channel at the receiver’s helper changes correspondingly.
Thus, merely observing the di↵erence of two channel estimates at the receiver’s helper side is not
feasible to distinguish immobility camouflage. Instead, we still propose to use a passive helper at
the receiver side but observe the ratio between the estimated channels at the receiver and at the
receiver’s helper to identify immobility camouflage.
Similar to the discussion of motion camouflage, we illustrate the defense against immobility
camouflage using Figure 3.9, where the attacker is stationary while she aims to make the receiver
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Figure 3.9: Immobility camouflage.
believe that she moves. Suppose that the attacker is stationary at location 1. Let hra and h
h
a
denote the estimated channel at the receiver and that at the receiver’s helper respectively when
the attacker launches the attack. Then, the attacker manipulates the transmitted symbol xa1 so
that the following equation holds 8><>:
xa1h
r
L1 = xh
r
a
xa1h
h
L1 = xh
h
a
. (3.9)
where x is the training symbol for channel estimation. Based on Equation 3.9, we have hra/h
h
a =
hrL1/h
h
L1
. Similarly, if the attacker actually moves to a new location (e.g., location 2), the estimated
channel estimates hra and h
h
a should satisfy the equation h
r
a/h
h
a = h
r
L2
/hhL2 . Thus, to make the
receiver believe that she is at location 2 while she is actually at location 1, the attacker needs to
make Equation 3.8 hold. Otherwise, the receiver can utilize the ratio of the estimated channel
at the receiver to that at the receiver’s helper to detect the immobility camouflage, as the ratio
remains the same when the attacker is stationary (i.e., normal case) and changes when the attacker
moves (i.e., immobility camouflage case). We now explore how this ratio di↵ers in the normal case
and an attack case through a real world experiment.
We collect channel data at the receiver and its helper, and then calculate the ratios hrai/h
h
ai of the
estimated channel at the receiver to that at the corresponding receiver’s helper. In the normal case,
we put the attacker at two di↵erent locations (e.g., location 1 and 2) without launching attacks.
Therefore, the estimated channel should be the real channel, i.e., hra1 = h
r
L1
, and hra2 = h
r
L2
. If an
attack based on immobility camouflage occurs, the attacker aims to make the receiver believe that
she is at two di↵erent locations. We introduce a new metric, called ratio proximity and denoted
with ⌘, to demonstrate how close the two ratios are. In order to make ⌘ range between 0 and 1, we
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Figure 3.10: The empirical CDFs of ⌘normal and ⌘attack.
divide the minimum valued ratio by the maximum valued ratio. Mathematically, we have
⌘ =
min(hra1/h
h
a1 , h
r
a2/h
h
a2)
max(hra1/h
h
a1 , h
r
a2/h
h
a2)
. (3.10)
Thus, when ⌘ is close to 1, it indicates that the two ratios are close.
We obtain two ratio proximity values ⌘normal and ⌘attack in the normal and attack cases, re-
spectively. Figure 3.10 shows the empirical CDFs P (⌘normal < x) and P (⌘attack < x). We can see
that ⌘normal varies from 0.14 to 1, and is less than 0.95 with the probability of 0.90, while ⌘attack is
greater than 0.95 with the probability of 0.98. This means, in the normal case, the ratio proximity
most likely deviates from 1, and consequently, Equation 3.8 rarely holds in practice. On the other
hand, under immobility camouflage, ratio proximity is always near 1, and thus we can use this
metric to successfully distinguish immobility camouflage.
Therefore, when the receiver finds that its two successive estimated channels are not the same,
it should be aware that either it su↵ers from immobility camouflage or the attacker indeed changes
her location. Furthermore, if the receiver realizes that the two corresponding values of the ratio
hra/h
h
a of the estimated channel at the receiver to that at the receiver’s helper are the same, the
attack is detected and the possibility that the attacker changes her location is excluded.
3.6 Experimental Evaluation
We build a prototype channel measurement system to demonstrate the impact of the identified
attack and the e↵ectiveness of the proposed defense. Our prototype is implemented on top of
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Figure 3.11: Floorplan of the building where the experiment is conducted.
USRPs [66], which are equipped with AD and DA converters as the RF front ends. The software
toolkit is GNURadio [67].
3.6.1 Evaluation Setup
We perform the experiment in a campus building with small o ces, wooden doors, windows,
metal and wooden furniture, and computers. Our prototype system consists of a malicious trans-
mitter and a receiver. Each node is a USRP connected to a commodity PC, and each USRP uses a
XCVR2400 daughter boards operating in the 2.4 GHz range as transceivers. The receiver estimates
the channel impulse responses from received signals, and verifies whether or not there is a location
change by comparing a newly estimated channel impulse response with an old one. The transmitter
runs the attacker program, which computes the weight vector to form the virtual channel, passes
the original signal through the virtual channel, and then feeds the virtual channel output to the real
wireless channel. Note that the maximum number of resolvable multipaths L is usually configured
to an empirical constant value depending on wireless system setups [33]. In this experiment, we set
L = 5 for our proof-of-concept implementation.
Figure 3.11 shows the positions of the receiver and the transmitter. We place the transmitter
at 10 di↵erent locations to launch the attack, and the receiver periodically estimates the channel
impulse responses.
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Figure 3.12: The Euclidean distance of the real and estimated channels.
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Figure 3.13: A replica of the CRAWDAD channel impulse response.
3.6.2 Example Attacks
We examine three example attacks: (1) injecting a randomly chosen channel impulse response
into the receiver, (2) reproducing a same channel impulse response in the CRAWDAD data set;
and (3) mimicking another location while hiding the true location. For all three attacks, we place
the transmitter at location 2 shown in Figure 3.11.
3.6.2.1 First Example: Generating a Random Channel Response
First we show an attack with intent to generate a random channel impulse response. Figure 3.12
plots the real channel impulse response between the transmitter and the receiver, the channel
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Figure 3.14: Real location mimicking.
impulse response chosen by the attacker, and the estimated channel impulse response at the receiver.
The y-axis and the x-axis indicate the power gain and the relevant path respectively. We can see
that the chosen channel impulse response and the estimated one are very similar to each other,
but both of them significantly deviate from the real channel. The Euclidean distance between the
chosen channel and the real channel is 0.3025, whereas that between the chosen channel and the
estimated channel is as small as 0.0686.
3.6.2.2 Second Example: Replicating a Same Channel Response in a Di↵erent Build-
ing
In the second example, an attacker aims to generate a channel impulse response in our o ce
building such that the generated channel impulse response is exactly the same as one in the CRAW-
DAD data set, which was collected in an o ce building in the University of Utah. We note our
USRP system is di↵erent from the CRAWDAD measurement system, Sigtek model ST-515, which
has a much higher bandwidth (40 MHz) than the USRP (10 MHz). Therefore, the CRAWDAD
measurement system can observe richer multipaths. Nevertheless, even with a relatively low-end
USRP, we can still duplicate the resolvable paths in a channel impulse response measured in the
CRAWDAD data set.
Specifically, we select one channel impulse response (between nodes 14 and 43) from the CRAW-
DAD data set and we plot it as “CRAWDAD channel” in Figure 3.13. We can see that this channel
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impulse response carries three peaks and thus exhibits three resolvable multipaths. We launch the
virtual multipath attack to make a replica of the same three resolvable multipaths observed at
the receiver in our experiment, which is shown as “Crafted channel” in Figure 3.13. The attack’s
crafted channel impulse response of the resolvable multipaths closely matches the CRAWDAD
channel response and their Euclidean distance is as small as 0.0036.
3.6.2.3 Third Example: Actual Location Mimicking
In the third example, the attacker performs actual location mimicking, mimicking location 1
from location 2 shown in Figure 3.11. The attacker first records the real channel impulse response
between herself and the receiver when she is at location 1, and then mimics this obtained channel
impulse response when it moves to location 2. Figure 3.14 plots the real channel impulse responses
between the transmitter and the receiver when the transmitter is at location 1 and 2 respectively,
as well as the estimated channel impulse response at the receiver when the attacker performs the
attack.
We can see that in normal situation, the real channels between the attack and the receiver when
the attacker is at location 1 and location 2 are quite di↵erent, and the Euclidean distance between
them is 0.5290. However, when the attacker launches the virtual multipath attack at location 2,
the estimated channel at the receiver is quite close to the real channel between the attacker and the
receiver when the attacker is at location 1, and the Euclidean distance between the two channels
turns to as small as 0.0964. Therefore, the attacker is able to e↵ectively make the receiver believe
that she is at location 1 while she is actually at location 2.
3.6.3 Overall Attack Impact
To examine the overall attack impact, we perform the following experiment. For each location
in Figure 3.11, we estimate the channel impulse responses during a short time window (around 10
– 30 seconds). For each estimates, we perform 100 trials, and in each trial we randomly generate
a length-5 vector whose elements range between 0 and 1. This vector is used as the attacker’s
chosen channel impulse response. We then launch the virtual multipath attack and record the
Euclidean distance dreal between the chosen channel impulse response and the pervious channel
impulse response estimated in the absence of the attacks (i.e., the real channel response), and
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Figure 3.15: The empirical CDFs of dreal and dest.
also record the Euclidean distance dest between the chosen one and the channel impulse response
estimated under the attacks. We repeat the same experiment for the other 9 locations.
Ideally, a successful attacker should have a large value of dreal (indicating that the attacker’s
chosen channel significantly di↵ers from the real channel) and a small value of dest (indicating that
the attacker’s chosen channel is close to the receiver’s estimated channel).
Denoted by P (dreal < x) and P (dest < x) the empirical CDFs of dreal and dest, respectively.
Figure 3.15 shows P (dreal < x) and P (dest < x) for 0  x  1.5. We can see that dest is less than
0.25 with probability 95.0%, dreal is larger than 0.9 with probability 95.0%. This means that dreal
is much larger than dest with high probability, therefore the attacker can drag the estimated value
of channel impulse response far away from its true value, and make it very close to her specified
one.
Existing schemes in general compare the di↵erence between the receiver’s current estimated
channel and previous reference channel with a threshold to check a location change [8, 9]. Since
our attacker can inject any random channel impulse response into the receiver with a very high
accuracy, the performance of existing location distinction schemes can be significantly degraded by
the virtual multipath attack. For example, given a threshold set less than 0.5 for location change
detection in our system, when the attack is launched, the receiver will think that the transmitter
moves because all the di↵erences between the estimated channel in the presence of the attack and
the reference channel (attack-free channel) exceed the threshold of 0.5. However, the estimated
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channel and the real channel are actually measured at the same location, and thus the location
distinction false alarm rate is raised to 100% under the virtual multipath attack.
Similarly, the virtual multipath attack can also easily defeat any method verifying that nodes
are from di↵erent locations based on examining the di↵erence of their channel impulse responses
(e.g., [15, 11]).
3.6.4 Evaluation of the Defense Method
We first show the practical feasibility of our defense method, then evaluate the performance.
3.6.4.1 Feasibility Evaluation
The defense approach functions based on a critical observation that the attacker cannot fool
both the receiver and the helper at the same time. Thus, in our feasibility evaluation, we would like
to examine how the channel estimation results of the receiver and the helper di↵er from each other,
so that such an inconsistency can reveal the existence of the virtual multipath attack. Towards
this goal, we perform the following experiment.
We place the attacker and the helper at each pair of the 10 locations, and we have 10⇥ 9 = 90
pairs of locations in total. Throughout the experiment, the receiver maintains its original position
as marked in Figure 3.11. The attacker launches the virtual multipath attack, and both the receiver
and the helper continuously do the channel estimation. Two 16-bit training sequences x1 (0xacdd)
and x2 (0xa4e2) are alternatively used for estimating the channel impulse responses.
The helper and the receiver estimate the channel impulse responses from two successive trans-
missions, then calculate the Euclidean distance between both estimates. Let dhelper and drec denote
the distances computed by the helper and the receiver, respectively. As analyzed in Section 3.4.1,
dhelper should be much larger than drec.
Figures 3.16 and 3.17 show the channel impulse responses estimated using x1 and x2 at the
receiver and the helper, when the attacker and the helper are placed at locations 2 and 8, respec-
tively. We can see that the virtual multipath attack leads to a much larger distance at the helper
than the receiver, i.e., dhelper   drec. Specifically, drec = 0.0093 and dhelper = 0.1199.
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Figure 3.16: The channel impulse responses estimated at the receiver.
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Figure 3.17: The channel impulse responses estimated at the helper.
3.6.4.2 Performance Evaluation
As mentioned earlier, the helper may use a threshold to enforce the detection. If dhelper is larger
than the threshold, then the attack is assumed. In general, detection and false positive rate are
two performance metrics associated with a detection method. The detection rate is the probability
that dhelper is larger than the threshold when there is indeed an attack. The false positive rate is
the probability that dhelper is larger than the threshold when there is no attack.
In this experiment, we evaluate the performance of the proposed defense approach in terms
of detection and false positive rates. We have 90 pairs of locations to place the attacker and the
helper. From each pair of the locations, we can obtain the corresponding distances dhelper and drec.
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Figure 3.18: The empirical CDFs of dhelper and drec.
We show the empirical CDFs P (dhelper < x) and P (drec < x) in Figure 3.18. We can see that in
all experiments, drec is always less than 0.0151 (i.e., P (drec < 0.0151)=1), whereas dhelper is always
greater than 0.0156. This means that if the helper uses 0.0151 as the detection threshold, the
defense system can achieve a detection rate of 1 as well as a false positive rate of 0. In general, any
threshold ranging between 0.0151 and 0.0156 can lead to the detection of all attacks, and meanwhile
maintain the usability of the receiver.
The helper may select imperfect thresholds that do not fall in this range. However, it is still pos-
sible to achieve a high detection accuracy. For example, if the threshold is set to 0.02, the detection
rate is as high as 91.2%, the false positive rate is still 0, which are obtained from Figure 3.18.
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CHAPTER 4
MANIPULATABLE WIRELESS KEY ESTABLISHMENT
Due to the broadcast nature of the wireless medium, private communications are easily eaves-
dropped. This has spurred extensive research into secret key establishment using physical layer
characteristics of wireless channels. In all these schemes, the shared secret keys directly originate
from the physical features of the real wireless channel, which is highly dependent on the communi-
cation environment nearby. Also, previous schemes require performing information reconciliation,
which increases both the costs of key establishment and the risk of key leakage over the not yet
secured channel.
In this chapter1, we exhibit a novel wireless key establishment method allowing the transmitter
to specify arbitrary content as the secret key and cause the receiver to obtain the same key by using
a channel manipulation technique. At the same time, eavesdroppers are prevented from deriving
the secret key. We furthermore exploit the transmitter’s ability to specify any content as the key
by enabling the transmitter to apply error-correction code to the key. This means the receiver
can automatically detect and correct any mismatched bits without sending key-related information
back to the transmitter over the public channel.
4.1 Preliminaries
We first present how the communicators can estimate the channel. Then we describe error
correction code standards, in particular types of Reed-Solomon codes, which are widely adopted
by modern communication systems.
1This chapter was published in 2017 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security [68]. Permission
is included in Appendix A.
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4.1.1 Channel Estimation
Channel impulse response quantifies the e↵ect of the multipath environment in wireless com-
munications. Each path imposes a time delay, magnitude attenuation, and phase shift on the signal
traveling along it. Channel is usually estimated based on training bit sequences and received signal
samples, as presented in Section 3.1. Physical layer channel estimation can be processed in either
frequency or time domains which are inter-convertible due to their linear relationship [33].
The received signal y(t) can be denoted as the convolution of the transmitted signal x(t) and the
channel impulse response h(t) (we omit the noise term for the sake of simplicity): y(t)=x(t) ⇤ h(t).
In the frequency domain, we have Y (f, t) =X(f, t)H(f, t), where Y (f, t), X(f, t) and H(f, t) are
the Fourier transforms of y(t), x(t) and h(t), respectively. Thus, with knowledge of the transmitted
and received signals, we easily obtain H(f, t) and perform the inverse Fourier transform operation
on it to find the corresponding channel impulse response h(t), denoted as h(t)=F 1{ Y (f,t)X(f,t)}, where
F 1{·} indicates the inverse Fourier transform. We sample the received signal with a symbol period
of Ts and obtain the following sampled impulse response vector with a length of L: h=[h1, · · · , hL],
where hi=h((i  1)Ts), i 2 {1, · · · , L}.
4.1.2 Error Correction Code
Error Correction Code (ECC) is developed to correct errors in data transmission and commonly
takes the form of block or convolutional ECC [33]. In block ECC, parity bits follow the information
bits, while in convolutional codes they are interspersed together. Reed-Solomon (RS) ECC [69] is
a typical block ECC with very strong error-correction capacity, especially against the burst errors
inherent to wireless communications [70]. Without loss of generality, we choose RS ECC to encode
and reconstruct our keys.
For a RS(n, k) code, k and n denote the length of the input and output symbol sequence,
respectively. Each symbol has a size of s bits and the maximum value of n is 2s   1. Information
bits, i.e., the selected key bits in our work, are divided into k symbols as the input of the RS
encoder. The RS encoder then calculates n  k parity symbols based on the input and adds them
behind the input symbols. Then, the encoded message constitutes n output symbols, of which an
RS decoder can correct any combination of up to 0.5(n  k) at random that contain errors [33].
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Figure 4.1: Flow chart of manipulatable wireless key establishment.
4.2 Assumptions and Attack Model
In a general scenario, Alice wants to establish a secret key with Bob. We assume that Alice and
Bob reside within each other’s communication range and have the ability to do channel estimation.
Also, we assume the training sequence for channel estimation is public, which conforms with the
design of many commercial wireless communication systems [71]. Besides, before launching channel
manipulation based key establishment, we assume Alice knows the actual channel impulse response
between herself and Bob. This can be achieved by estimating the channel impulse response from the
wireless signals (e.g., key establishment inquiries) emitted by Bob. Finally, the RS code enforced
by Alice is assumed publicly available so that Bob can do the corresponding decryption.
In our attack model, we consider that an attacker Eve aims to derive the secret key established
between Alice and Bob, and presume that Eve has the ability to 1) do channel estimation; 2) know
the secret key quantization algorithm and the RS code that the transmitter utilizes.
4.3 Key Establishment Scheme
4.3.1 Scheme Outline
The transmitter first chooses a key, encodes it with RS ECC. The selection of RS code is based
on the length of the chosen key and other environmental factors which are studied in Section
4.4.4. After that, the transmitter maps the encoded key into an artificial channel impulse response,
denoted as h0(t). To launch the channel manipulation, the transmitter needs then to calculate the
aggregate signal x0(t) to send. Correspondingly, the signal y0(t) received from the transmitter can
be represented by y0(t) = x0(t) ⇤ h(t), where h(t) is the actual channel impulse response between
the transmitter and the receiver. The receiver uses y0(t) and the public transmitted signal x(t) to
do channel estimation. With hˆ(t) denoting the estimated channel impulse response at the receiver,
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we have x(t) ⇤ hˆ(t) = x0(t) ⇤ h(t). Hence, the transmitter should construct the aggregated signal
x0(t) to make hˆ(t) = h0(t). We give the detailed calculation in Section 4.3.3.
With hˆ(t), the receiver first obtains a bit sequence via quantization, and then feeds it into a RS
decoder. As long as the number of symbol errors in the quantized bit sequence does not exceed the
error correction capability of the chosen RS code, the receiver can successfully recover the secret
key specified by the transmitter. Figure 4.1 shows the flow chart of the proposed key establishment.
4.3.2 Key Mapping
Key mapping is the process of encrypting the selected binary key bits with RS code, and
converting the encrypted key into an artificial channel impulse response. A channel impulse response
is actually composed of a sequence of complex numbers. To simplify the conversion process, the
channel impulse response used here refers to its magnitude, which is a vector of decimal numbers.
Thus, key mapping can be regarded as a binary-decimal conversion.
The transmitter can arbitrarily specify a sequence of bits as the secret key, and then input it
into an RS encoder. An RS(n, k) code has n symbols of s bits each, the first k of which are symbols
comprised of selected key bits and any required padding and the rest calculated based on the RS
algorithm and the k-symbol input. Given a symbol size s, the maximum length of the encoded
message is m = 2s   1, so n  m should hold. Finally, the RS decoder can correct any (n   k)/2
symbol errors in the encoded message. As an example, RS(31, 15) code with 5 bits for each symbol
can accommodate a chosen key size of up to 15⇥ 5 = 75 bits, where if less than 75, remaining bits
are padded with zeros. Also, errors in up to (31   15)/2 = 8 symbols anywhere in the encoded
message can be corrected by the decoder.
The next step is to convert the encoded message with n ⇤ s bits into channel impulse responses,
each a length-L vector of decimal numbers, where L denotes the maximum number of manipulated
resolvable multipath components that can be observed by the receiver. Generally, the transmitter
can use two di↵erent conversion strategies, an absolute value based and a relative value based. In the
former, a bit sequence is regarded as a binary number and directly translated into a decimal number
denoting the value of a path response. In the latter case, a bit is translated into a quantitative
relationship of two path responses, and this relationship may be the comparison result of the value
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Figure 4.2: Channel manipulation filter.
size or the ratio. In this paper, we focus on the relative value based method, mapping the bits into
the relation (di↵erence) between path response values.
Let hm = [hm1, hm2, · · · , hmL] denote the generated channel impulse response. The di↵erences
between the first path response value and the others are  1 = hm2   hm1,  2 = hm3   hm1, · · ·,
 L 1 = hmL hm1 respectively. With these (L 1) path response value di↵erences, we can compute
another b(L  1)/2c di↵erences, defined by  (L 1)+i = | 2i 1|  | 2i|, i 2 {1, 2, · · · , b(L  1)/2c}.
In fact, further levels could be utilized, but we use two for the scope of this paper. Hence, a bit
sequence with length Lb = L 1+b(L  1)/2)c can generate a channel impulse response with length
L using each of these di↵erences to define one bit. In order to reduce the error, the transmitter uses a
quantum q as a positive or negative path di↵erential to distinguish these di↵erences for constructing
an artificial multipath response. Based on the selected key and this q, the manipulated channel is
assembled such that 8><>:  i = q+, if key bit is 1 i = q , if key bit is 0,
where i 2 {1, 2, · · · , Lb}. In Section 4.4.3, we show that when the path di↵erential q is well chosen,
the bits extracted by the receiver are identical to the bits specified by the transmitter with high
probability. In this manner, the encoded key of n ⇤ s bits can be mapped into d(n ⇤ s)/Lbe channel
impulse responses, which are then launched in the channel manipulation step which follows.
4.3.3 Channel Manipulation
The goal of channel manipulation is to make the channel impulse response estimated at the
receiver equal to the artificial channel impulse response generated through key mapping, i.e., hˆ =
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hm. As mentioned earlier, the transmitter intends to emulate the real multipath e↵ect by sending
aggregated weighted, delayed copies of the original transmitting signal.
Again, channel manipulation can be regarded as a delay-weight-sum module, implemented by
a finite impulse response (FIR) filter as shown in Figure 4.2. The delay is set to one symbol
duration, the transmission time of one symbol as denoted by Ts. The impulse response of the
channel manipulation process can be represented by w(t) =
PL
i=1wi (t   t0   (i   1)Ts), where
t0 is the arrival time of the first arrived signal copy. Thus, the manipulated transmission signal is
the convolution of the transmitted signal x(t) with the impulse response w(t). This manipulated
transmission signal x(t) ⇤ w(t) is sent to the receiver through the real multipath channel. Hence,
the corresponding signal obtained by the receiver is ym(t) = (x(t) ⇤ w(t)) ⇤ h(t). The receiver
then utilizes the received signal and the public probe signal x(t) to estimate the channel impulse
response, described as ym(t) = x(t) ⇤ hˆ(t). Based on the associativity of convolution, we obtain
hˆ(t) = w(t) ⇤ h(t). Channel manipulation aims to make hˆ(t) = hm(t), where hm(t) is the value
of hm at a given time. Therefore, we have hm(t) = w(t) ⇤ h(t), and in the frequency we get
Hm(f, t) = W (f, t)H(f, t), where Hm(f, t) and W (f, t) are the Fourier transforms of hm(t) and
w(t). Therefore, we can solve the impulse response w(t) of channel manipulation as
w(t) = F 1{Hm(f, t)
H(f, t)
} = F 1{Ym(f, t)
Y (f, t)
}.
Thus, the transmitter is able to set the parameter w = [w1, · · · , wL], enabling the receiver to obtain
the generated channel impulse response hm.
4.3.4 Key Retrieval
With the estimated channel impulse response, the receiver runs quantization to generate bits.
This key retrieval process is an inverse process of key mapping, i.e., a decimal-binary conversion.
Algorithm 4.1 describes the key retrieval process which we elaborate upon next. The quantizer we
use is defined as
Q( i) =
8><>: 1, if  i > 00, otherwise.
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Algorithm 4.1 Key retrieval algorithm
Input: Multiple channel estimates hˆj = [hˆ1, hˆ2, · · · , hˆL], j 2 {1, 2, · · · , M}
Ensure: A cryptographic key Kb
1: K  ;
2: for j = 1 to M do
3: for i = 1 to (L  1) do
4:  i  hˆi+1   hˆ1
5: K  [K; Q( i)]
6: end for
7: for i = 1 to b(L  1)/2c do
8:  L 1+i  | ˆ2i 1|  | ˆ2i|
9: K  [K; Q( L 1+i)]
10: end for
11: if length(K) == n ⇤ s then
12: dec RSDecoder(n, k, K)
13: Kb  [Kb; dec(1 : (k ⇤ s))]
14: K  ;
15: end if
16: end for
Note that since we remove the exchange of reconciliation information, missing bits are not handled
in quantization. The quantizer defined above always returns a value, so the receiver will obtain a
bit sequence of length Lb after applying quantization to an estimated channel impulse response.
• With obtained channel estimates hˆ = [hˆ1, hˆ2, · · · , hˆL], the receiver first calculates the L   1
di↵erences between the first estimated path response and each of the others with the equation
 i = hˆi+1   hˆ1, where i 2 {1, 2, · · · , L   1}. For each calculated di↵erence, the receiver
quantizes it using Q(·).
• The receiver next computes the b(L  1)/2c di↵erences between every pair of di↵erences calcu-
lated in the previous step, using  L 1+i = | ˆ2i 1|  | ˆ2i|, where i 2 {1, 2, · · · , b(L  1)/2c}.
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Again, the receiver quantizes each newly obtained di↵erence with quantizer Q(·). Between
these two steps, the total number of di↵erences calculated is Lb = L  1 + b(L  1)/2c.
• Once the length of the obtained bits reaches the required length n ⇤ s of the chosen RS(n, k)
decoder, the receiver decodes them, and the first k symbols in the decoded message are then
extracted as the secret key of k ⇤ s bits.
To more clearly demonstrate the key retrieval process, we pick L = 3 as an example. At the receiver
side, the estimated channel impulse response is denoted as hˆ = [hˆ1, hˆ2, hˆ3], the corresponding
di↵erences are calculated by  1 = hˆ2   hˆ1,  2 = hˆ3   hˆ1 and  3 = | 1|  | 2|. The receiver then
obtains 3 bits by quantizing. This process is repeated, reassembling the encoded key 3 bits at a
time, until all (possibly including padding) have arrived. The bits are finally decoded according to
the selected RS ECC scheme into the secret key.
4.3.5 Security Analysis
4.3.5.1 Eavesdropping Attacks
The correlation coe cient ⇢ between the two channels observed at the receiver and the eaves-
dropper respectively can be present with J0(2⇡
D
  ), where J0(·) is the first kind Bessel function
of order zero, and D is the distance between the receiver and the eavesdropper [72, 73]. When
D/    1/2, ⇢ approaches 0. That means, when the eavesdropper and the receiver are spaced at
least a half wavelength apart, it yields zero correlation. However, in the real world, there is poor
scattering and/or a strong line-of-sight component, the spatial separation between the receiver and
the eavesdropper should be longer (e.g., several wavelengths) in order to obtain uncorrelated chan-
nels [7]. Generally, the eavesdropper may employ two di↵erent schemes to obtain the manipulated
channel (and thus extract the secret key), i.e., direct observation and indirect observation:
• It is unlikely that the eavesdropper could occupy the same physical location with the trans-
mitter or receiver, as the exposure risk would be dramatically increased. Due to the spatial
uncorrelation property, a small location di↵erence (e.g., several wavelengths) would cause an
observed channel change, and following discrepancies in the extracted keys.
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• A further concern is whether it is possible for the eavesdropper to calculate the manipulated
channel with her own observed channel even she is not at the same location with the receiver.
As mentioned in Section 4.3.3, the manipulated channel hm(t) = w(t)⇤h(t). So to learn hm(t),
an eavesdropper should not only know the impulse response w(t) of the channel manipulation
process, but also the real channel impulse response h(t) between the transmitter and the
receiver. Let ye(t) denote the signal received by the eavesdropper when the transmitter
launches channel manipulation, and let he(t) denote the real channel impulse response between
the transmitter and eavesdropper. Thus we haveye(t)=x(t)⇤w(t)⇤he(t). Therefore, to learn
w(t), the eavesdropper must learn he(t). However, the transmitter can always hide its real
channel or stay silent before launching key establishment, thus the eavesdropper would fail
to obtain w(t). Besides, we allow the transmitter to randomize the channel manipulation
process and thus the value of w(t) can be updated at any time, so that the eavesdropper will
require far more e↵ort. Even w(t) is disclosed, h(t) is also unknown to the eavesdropper due
to the same reason as in the first scheme (i.e., the eavesdropper is unable to put a helper
node co-located with the transmitter to measure the real channel). Therefore, this attack
requirement is more stringent than the previous.
4.3.5.2 RS Code Impact
Due to the noise and hardware di↵erences, the quantized bit sequence at the receiver may have
bit discrepancies with the key Ka selected by the transmitter. With RS code, the receiver can
obtain the secret key Kb and Kb = Ka. One concern is whether the enforced RS code can help the
eavesdropper to correct those mismatched bits as well, leading that her extracted key Ke is same
with Ka. We define a term channel proximity, denoted with dij , to quantify the di↵erence between
two channels i and j, which equals the Euclidean distance between two obtained channel impulse
responses, i.e., dij = ||hi   hj ||. Channel proximity between respectively observed channels at an
eavesdropper and a receiver highly depends on the distance between them.
Suppose C denotes the count of mismatched symbols in the quantized symbol sequence (e.g.,
{s1, · · · , sn}) for a corresponding n-symbol codeword (e.g., {s1enc, · · · , snenc}) selected by the trans-
mitter. We construct a function M(·) to model the relationship between the channel proximity dij
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with the count C, i.e., C = M(dij) =
P
j2{1,··· ,n}(s
j   sjenc) (if sj and sjenc have mismatched bits,
sj   sjenc equals 1, otherwise 0). Theoretically, when dij = 0, i.e., the two observed channels are
totally the same, the generated bit sequences from them should be the same, i.e., C = 0. While
if dij = 1, i.e., the two target channels are totally di↵erent, the worst case is that all symbols
in the generated two bit sequences are di↵erent, i.e., C = n. We utilize dtr and dte to denote
the channel proximities between the estimated channels at the transmitter and the receiver, and
at the transmitter and the eavesdropper, respectively. In the experiment (i.e., Section 4.4.3), we
show that M(·) is a monotonically increasing function in practice. Lemma 1 presents that with an
appropriately selected RS code, the transmitter and the receiver are able to establish a secret key
in the presence of an eavesdropper.
Lemma 1. Suppose that M(·) is monotonically increasing, when the selected RS(n, k) satisfies
dtr M 1((n  k)/2) < dte, Ka = Kb 6= Ke can be achieved.
Proof. The error correction capability of RS(n, k) is to correct (n   k)/2 symbols per codeword.
We set a channel proximity threshold d0, above which the two channels are regarded as di↵erent,
while below we regard the two channels are identical. Due to the property of wireless channel
reciprocity, the estimated channels at the transmitter and the receiver would be almost the same,
i.e., dtr ⇡ 0. When dtr  M 1((n   k)/2), we have M(dtr)  (n   k)/2. Thus, the errors at the
receiver can be corrected by the RS code, i.e., Ka = Kb.
On the other hand, due to the channel uncorrelation property, the estimated channels at the
eavesdropper (e.g., more than several wavelengths away from the receiver) and the transmitter
would be totally di↵erent, i.e., dte > d0. When M 1((n k)/2) < dte, we have M(dte) > (n k)/2.
Thus, the errors at the eavesdropper are unable to be corrected by the RS code, i.e., Ke 6= Ka.
4.3.5.3 Active Attacks
The proposed wireless key establishment scheme may also be targeted by active adversaries,
who may try to design, interrupt, intercept, block or overwrite the transmit signals to disrupt
the legitimate receiver extracting the secret key specified by the transmitter. For example, an
active adversary may jam the communication between the transmitter and the receiver so that
the receiver may obtain an incorrect signal. Those attacks are not unique to our scheme, and
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all previous wireless key establishments are vulnerable to them. For example, Eberz et al. [74]
propose a practical man-in-the-middle attack, in which an active attacker is able to impersonate
both participants by injecting spoofed packets so Alice and Bob agree on a common key which the
attacker knows. In our scheme, however, any injection or jamming by the attacker only changes
the key the receiver extracts but is unable to sabotage the key at the transmitter, because the
key at the transmitter is always specified by the transmitter itself, instead of extracted from the
received signal. As a result, those active attacks would cause discrepancies easily detectable by
the transmitter and the receiver. Besides, some techniques have been proposed to remove such
active attacks. For example, to defend against jamming attacks, researchers have proposed spread
spectrum approaches like Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS) (e.g., [75]) and Direct
Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) (e.g., [76, 77, 78]). We can combine those techniques and the
proposed key establishment scheme in order to successfully establish a secret key under active
attack scenarios.
4.4 Experimental Evaluation
4.4.1 Methodology
Our prototype system consists of a transmitter (Tx), a receiver (Rx), and an eavesdropper (Ex).
Each node is a USRP N210 connected to a PC. USRPs are equipped with SBX daughter boards
operating in the the 0.4⇠4.4 GHz range as transceivers. The software toolkit is GNURadio [67].
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We performed the key establishment in a campus building with small o ces and assorted furniture,
forming a rich multipath environment. As shown in Figure 4.3, Rx defines the origin O, and Tx is
tested in five other locations (L1⇠L5). We compare the obtained key and the original key specified
by Tx to determine whether the key establishment is successful, and calculate the success rate
(i.e., the ratio between the number of successful key establishments and the total number of key
establishment trials) through a large range of experiments.
Intuitively, the success rate can be a↵ected by the setting of key mapping (i.e., the path di↵er-
ential), the RS ECC in use for key establishment, the manipulated multipath count, and the key
length. In the following experiments, we explore how these factors can impact the key establishment
performance.
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Figure 4.6: Setup of eavesdropper (Ex) near receiver (Rx).
4.4.2 Measuring Channel Proximities
We first verify the spatial uncorrelation property in the experimental environment. As shown
in Figure 4.3, we place Tx at one of the five locations, Ex at another, and Rx at the origin O,
repeating the experiment for every unique pair of locations. Both Tx and Ex estimate the channel
impulse response between their respective locations and Rx. Note that existing channel estima-
tion algorithms assume a resolvable multipath, and we usually configure the maximum number of
resolvable multipaths to an empirical constant value depending on wireless system setups [33]. In
this experiment, we consider a channel with five multipath components for our proof-of-concept
implementation. We perform 1000 estimates at each location, and thus we obtain 1000 estimation
values of the corresponding channel impulse response, denoted by length-5 vectors containing each
of the five components. We then calculate the mean of the estimated channel impulse response
values for each path in the vector. As an example, Figure 4.4 shows the mean values of channel
estimation results at Locations 1 and 3. The observed channels at two places clearly comprise
di↵erent shapes, especially in the first three path values.
Figure 4.5 plots the empirical cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of the channel proxim-
ities d1 and d3 between two channel impulse responses estimated at Locations 1 and 3, respectively,
as well as the channel proximity d13 between one estimated at L1 and one at L3. We can see that
the probability that d13 is bigger than d1 or d3 is almost 100%. This means we can easily distinguish
channels observed at L1 and L3, implying validity of the spatial uncorrelation property of wireless
channels. Channel estimation for other pairs of the 5 locations demonstrate similar results and
indicate our key establishment scheme should perform well, as we illustrate through the rest of this
Evaluation.
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Table 4.1: Channel proximity (⇥10 4) under di↵erent fc
fc (GHz)   (m) 0.25m 0.5m 0.75m 1m
1.2 0.25 0.11 0.35 0.63 0.85
2.4 0.125 0.20 0.51 0.90 0.92
We set the central frequency as 1.2GHz. To explore the relationship between the calculated
channel proximity at Ex and the distance between Ex and Rx, we change the distance between Rx
and Ex every 0.25m, starting from 0.25m (i.e., a wavelength for 1.2GHz signals), and each time we
calculate and record the corresponding average channel proximity between the estimated channel
at Ex and that at Tx. Table 4.1 demonstrates the impact of the distance on the observed channel
proximity. We can see with the distance between Ex and Rx increasing, the channel proximity
becomes larger, and then maintains a stable high value, which demonstrates that the observed
channels at Tx and Ex are uncorrelated.
Besides, we increase the central frequency to 2.4GHz and re-calculate the corresponding channel
proximities. A larger central frequency fc brings a shorter signal wavelength   (i.e.,   =
3⇥108
fc
)
in theory and therefore decreases the distance required for obtaining an uncorrelated channel. As
shown in Table 4.1, for the same distance, Ex observes a higher channel proximity when the central
frequency is 2.4GHz, which means the observed channel at Ex in this case has bigger di↵erences
with the receiver’s channel.
To protect the secret key from Ex, we should keep the observed channels at Ex and Rx uncor-
related, so that Ex will obtain the least information from the observed channel. Thus, we keep Ex
at least 1m away from Rx, as Table 4.1 shows that 1m can guarantee that the observed channel
at Ex is uncorrelated with that at Rx. To measure the confidentiality of the generated secret key,
we compute and compare the success rates for Ex in breaking the secret key at varying distances
away from Rx. As shown in Figure 4.6, we draw a circle originating at Rx and place Ex at a radius
ranging outward from 1 to 4 meters.
4.4.3 Path Di↵erential Selection
In the key mapping stage, we set the normalized value of the first path of the manipulated
channel impulse response to 0.5, and vary the value of the path di↵erential q from 0.05 to 0.2, with
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increments of 0.05. For each q, we perform 1000 attempts of establishing a 3-bit key not involving
RS ECC between Tx and Rx. Figure 4.7 shows the success rate of 3-bit key establishment for Rx
and Ex when Rx is placed at L1 and Ex is varied from 1 to 4 meters away. We can observe three
major tendencies. First, larger distances between Rx and Ex generally result in a lesser ability
for Ex to extract the key. When Ex is 1 meter away from Rx, the success rate to break the 3-bit
key ranges from 23.7% to 33.6%, while when the distance increases to 4 meters, the success rate
falls in the range of 12.8% to 19.3%, which is almost equivalent to the success rate of a random
guess (the chance for a random guess to hit the correct 3-bit key is 12.5%). This appears due to
the channels for Rx and Ex diverging with increased distance between them. This demonstrates
the count of mismatched symbols normally increases with the distance between Rx and Ex, or
the observed channel proximity at Ex, i.e., the function M(·) is really monotonically increasing in
practice. Second, the success rate at Rx is always much higher that that at Ex. For example, when
q value is 0.1, the success rate at Rx and Ex 4 meters away are 83.3% and 14.0% respectively.
Finally, the success rate of key establishment increases with the increasing q. When q = 0.05, the
success rate at Rx decreases to 74.1%, while the success rate at Rx reaches 88.9% when q = 0.2.
This is because larger q further separates the path responses generated by Tx to better overcome
interference.
Though the success rate of establishing a 3-bit key at Rx can reach as high as around 88.9%,
this success rate may not be reliable enough to secure private communications in practice. In order
to eliminate the bit inconsistence between the specified key bits at Tx and the quantized bits at
Rx, we introduce RS ECC to encode the secret key. As q = 0.1 achieves the largest di↵erence
between the success rate at Rx and that at the surrounding Ex in this initial test for success rate,
we employ q = 0.1 for the following discussions.
4.4.4 RS Code Integration
In this section, we investigate the success rate after incorporating RS code and explore how to
select an appropriate RS code. Intuitively, the chosen RS code should make sure that the success
rate at Rx can be increased close to 100%, without improving the success rate at Ex and rendering
insecure the established key between Tx and Rx.
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Figure 4.7: Success rate vs. value of q.
Our selection criteria for enforced RS code is that its error-correction capability should exceed
the failure rate (i.e., 1  success rate) of key establishment at the receiver while remaining below
the failure rate at the eavesdropper. Thus, the success rate at the receiver should increase to almost
100% while the success rate at the eavesdropper stays low. As shown in Figure 4.7, when q = 0.1,
the failure rate at the receiver is 1   83.3% = 16.7% while the failure rate at the eavesdropper
placed at various distances from the receiver is at most 1  26.5% = 73.5%. So we utilize RS(7, 3)
code which is able to correct 2 symbol errors for a codeword with 7 symbols, which is more than the
expected 1.2 symbol errors from a 16.7% failure rate on the receiver but less than the expected 5.1
symbol errors from the eavesdropper’s 73.5% failure rate. To further explore the e↵ect of RS code
choice on the performance, we enlarge the length of a RS codeword and select another three RS
codes under the guidance of the aforementioned selection criteria: RS(15, 7) (4 bits per symbol),
RS(31, 17) and RS(31, 15) (5 bits per symbol). For each RS code, we perform 5000 attempts of key
establishment using five RS codewords as an example and record the success rate at Rx and the Ex
around. Note communicators may establish keys from multiple channel estimations and combine
the bits from each to form an aggregate secret key.
Figure 4.8 plots the success rate of key establishment for Rx, we can observe that the success
rate for Rx decreases as the code e ciency (i.e., k/n for RS(n, k)) increases. For example, the code
e ciency of RS(7, 3) is 42.9% and its success rate is as high as 97%, while the code e ciency of
RS(31, 17) is 54.8% and the corresponding success rate decreases to 78.7%. However, for RS code
of higher code e ciency, its encoded key size becomes shorter. A RS(7, 3) codeword can encode a
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Figure 4.9: Success rate for Ex.
key of length 3⇥ 3 = 9 bits whereas a RS(31, 17) codeword can encode a key of length 17⇥ 5 = 85
bits.
Figure 4.9 shows the success rate at Ex of di↵erent distance away with Rx. Compare with
Rx’s high success rate (78.7%⇠97%), the success rate at Ex is markedly low, ranging from 0.09%
to 0.47%. The chosen RS code is unable to correct most errors incurred at Ex, so that while
ECC allows the correct decoding of the key at Rx, Ex is unable to use it to decode the key as
Rx does. This is because the channels of Ex and Rx are strongly uncorrelated, and the artificial
channel impulse response observed by Ex exhibits more bits mismatched with the actual key than
Rx. These extra mismatched bits overflow the decoding capability of ECC, thereby leading to the
incorrect decoding of the key at Ex.
In general, when the channel of the eavesdropper is uncorrelated with that of the receiver, it
is highly likely that a typical RS code would allow the receiver to reconstruct the key with a high
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success rate and meanwhile yield a very low success rate at the eavesdropper. To further refine the
code selection, an empirical profile may be built to reveal the relationship between the number of
bit errors and the distance from the receiver. Assuming that the eavesdropper is at least d meters
away from the receiver, the communicators can then look up the profile to determine an appropriate
ECC code with an error correction capability ranging between x and y, where x is the number of
bit errors typically encountered by the receiver and y is the number of bit errors measured d meters
away from the receiver.
4.4.5 Key Length
In order to provide e↵ective protection for private communications between two individuals,
the secret key that the transmitter and the receiver intend to establish should be suitably long.
Depending on di↵erent encryption methods, various key length recommendations and mathematical
formulas approximate the minimum key size requirement for security [79]. Symmetric encryption
algorithms usually utilize keys of length 128 to 512 bits, for example.
Note that it is not necessary for Alice and Bob to establish a key with enough length via
one communication or even one channel estimation. Thus, they may establish secret keys from
multiple channel estimations and combine the bits from each to form an aggregate secret key able
to provide e↵ective encryption security. This preserves our goal of removing the necessity for back-
and-forth public communication of secret key information present in the reconciliation step inherent
to mainstream key establishment schemes.
Table 4.2 shows the relationship between the success rate of key establishment and key length
when we utilize RS(15, 7) code to encode the key. This appears as one would expect when varying
the length of typical cryptographic keys, demonstrating a clear divergence between success rates for
the receiver vs. the eavesdropper with higher key length. Indeed, the success rate for eavesdroppers
lowers to 0% with a 168-bit key, but key establishment between legitimate users is still successful.
4.4.6 Manipulated Path Count
At the key mapping stage, the transmitter maps a bit sequence with length Lb into a manipu-
lated channel impulse response vector with size L. Correspondingly, the receiver will generate Lb
bits as the secret key from an estimated channel impulse response. Previous experiments discuss
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Table 4.2: Success rate (%) vs. key length (bits)
Key length Rx Ex-1m Ex-2m Ex-3m Ex-4m
112 96.0 1.56 1.00 1.21 0.94
140 94.8 0.42 0.29 0.39 0.32
168 91.0 0.10 0.06 0.04 0
Table 4.3: Success rate (%) vs. value of L
Value of L Rx Ex-1m Ex-2m Ex-3m Ex-4m
3 94.8 0.42 0.29 0.39 0.32
4 92.2 0.34 0.29 0.39 0.30
5 86.3 0.31 0.31 0.41 0.27
the situation when L = 3, and we now analyze the e↵ect of di↵erent L on the performance. Essen-
tially, the number L of manipulated paths in a channel impulse response determines the number
of bits that the transmitter can include per channel impulse response. Based on the relationship
Lb = L   1 + bL  1c/2 mentioned in Section 4.3.2, when L is set to 4, Lb would be 4, and when
L is set to 5, Lb would be 6.
Table 4.3 shows the relationship between the success rate of 140-bit key and the number of
manipulated paths, using RS(15, 7) code. We see that the success rate at the receiver decreases
with the value of L increasing. When L = 5, the success rate moves to below 90%; with more paths
to manipulate, the key establishment is more susceptible to channel noise. The success rates at the
surrounding eavesdroppers, however, do not decrease notably and varies between 0.27% and 0.42%,
again demonstrating that the success rate at the eavesdropper mainly depends on the uncertainty
of its observed channel.
4.4.7 Overall Performance for a Wide Range of Locations
To ensure the proposed key establishment is generalizable, we move Tx to each of the other
locations and examine the performance of the key establishment. Table 4.4 shows the success rates
at the receiver and surrounding eavesdroppers when Tx is placed at each of the locations other
than L1 and establishes a 168-bit key utilizing RS(15, 7) code. The number L of manipulated paths
ranges from 3 to 5. The success rate at the receiver (ranging from 81.2%⇠92.2%) is visibly much
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Table 4.4: Success rate (%) of key establishment for a wide range of locations
L2 L3 L4 L5
L 3 4 5 3 4 5 3 4 5 3 4 5
Rx 91.1 87.5 86.0 92.2 87.6 81.2 92.4 89.4 88.1 91.1 85.5 82.9
Ex-1m 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.14 0.10 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.06 0.12 0.10 0.08
Ex-2m 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.14 0.08 0.06
Ex-3m 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.02
Ex-4m 0.02 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.02 0 0 0 0
higher than those at the eavesdroppers (0%⇠0.14%), and successively larger separation causes the
eavesdropper’s success rate to continue dropping, especially when Ex lies in 4 meters distance away
from Rx, it is almost impossible for her to break the key established between Tx and Rx. Through
the whole experiment, we show
• Error correction code improves the success rate for Rx while causing no increase in Ex’s
e↵ectiveness. This follows from the ability to choose an RS code resolving a number of bit
errors larger than Rx typically encounters but smaller than the number by Ex.
• Increasing key length to sizes typical of modern keys reduces Ex to near zero e cacy without
decreasing the success rate of key establishment.
• Performance of the key establishment method holds steady at all our tested locations and so
is concluded to be robust in practice.
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CHAPTER 5
FUTURE WORK
I discuss two directions of my future work, i.e., wireless key establishment when communicators
move locations and human privacy protection.
5.1 Wireless Key Establishment in Moving Scenarios
When Bob moves to a new location, Alice and Bob cannot reuse the previous or “old” key
they established with the technique described in Chapter 4 when Bob was at the old location. An
eavesdropper may occupy Bob’s old position and will be able to infer the old key so long as the
channel between that location and Alice remains largely unchanged. Also, Bob needs to prove his
identify to Alice if he wishes to re-establish a secret key and continue communications.
I plan to solve the challenge of the key re-establishment problem between Alice and Bob when
Alice or Bob moves.
5.2 Wireless-Assisted Human Privacy Eavesdropping
Based on the observation that di↵erent human activities may introduce di↵erent multipath
distortions in WiFi signals, recent research reveals exciting progress in detecting human activities
with wireless signals [80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88] and thus eavesdropping human privacies.
Traditional methods to achieve human activity recognition often use cameras, radars or various
wearable sensors. However, camera based methods require lighting, radar solutions have limited
operational range, and wearable sensor based methods require the user to wear sensors and thus
are inconvenient. The main advantages of utilizing wireless channel characteristics over traditional
methods to achieve human activity recognition are that they do not require lighting, provide better
coverage as wireless signals can operate through walls, and do not require users to carry any devices
as they rely on WiFi signals naturally reflected by humans [86].
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Existing human activity recognition systems exploiting wireless channel characteristics normally
work well only under relatively stable and controlled environments [87]. A concern is whether such
systems still work with high accuracy in a variable and dynamic environment. More e↵orts need to
be done to improve the robustness of schemes exploiting wireless channel characteristics for human
privacy eavesdropping, and this would be one of my future research directions.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
This dissertation includes two work about channel camouflage and manipulation techniques to
improve the security of existing wireless channel based authentication systems or secure communi-
cation mechanisms.
In the first work, we identify a new attack against location distinction systems in wireless
networks. In such an attack, the adversary can easily hide her location changes or impersonate
movements by injecting fake wireless channel characteristics into a target receiver. To defend
against this attack, we propose a detection technique that utilizes an auxiliary receiver or antenna
to identify these fake channel characteristics.
In the second work, we exhibit a novel wireless key establishment method allowing the trans-
mitter to specify arbitrary content as the secret key and cause the receiver to obtain the same key
by using a channel manipulation technique. At the same time, eavesdroppers are prevented from
deriving the secret key. We furthermore exploit the transmitter’s ability to specify any content
as the key by enabling the transmitter to apply error-correction code to the key. This means the
receiver can automatically detect and correct any mismatched bits without sending key-related
information back to the transmitter over the public channel.
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